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Abstract
In this thesis we consider the problem of extending and adapting the
classical Gambler's Ruin (GR) problem so that it can be played over net-
works in a manner consistent with both the classical two-player and the fully
connected N -player GR problem.
We introduce an extended GR problem, in which players in a network
compete against the opponents to whom they are connected, and in which
players exit the network either when they achieve a speciﬁed target or when
they become bankrupt. In both cases, the game continues with the remain-
ing players. While a bankrupted player simply leaves the network, successful
players (achievers) may produce one or more oﬀspring who connect to the
network and continue playing the game with a share of the achiever's re-
sources. We simulate the extended GR problem in the case of contracting,
ﬁxed and evolving networks.
A key motivation is to understand the interplay between the game and
the network, i.e., how the topology of the network inﬂuences the progression
of the GR problem game, and, conversely, how the game inﬂuences the
evolution of the network topology. Therefore we consider several attachment
rules, including random and preferential attachment. We also introduce a
bespoke preferential attachment rule called kudos. Unlike the established
preferential attachment rules, we ﬁnd that kudos induces a phase transition
in the network, as the size of target is varied.
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1 Introduction
In the Gambler's Ruin (GR) problem we are concerned with the likelihood of a
player becoming bankrupt given an initial resource and a chance of winning a sin-
gle bet [Shoesmith (1986)]. Typically, a player competes against an entity that
is theoretically represented by an opponent or opponents with an inﬁnite resource,
for instance, a player playing the stock market [Hadjiliadis and Vecer (2006)] or
even a lottery game [Hunter et al (2008)]. Here the bet is represented by some
form of competitive engagement with the entity. On the other hand, the Classi-
cal GR problem considers two players with ﬁnite resources engaging with each
other [Sandell (1989)]. In these circumstances, the player's objective(s) is to
make the other bankrupt or to cease when they have reached a certain tar-
get [Hadjiliadis (2004)].
The motivation of this thesis is not to model the behaviour of a gambler per
se, but the generic competitive behaviour of players in the business and social
environment. This leads us to consider networks of players. For example, in the
business world, a multinational company may have a single objective but engage a
multiple number of opponents who do not necessarily compete with each other. To
demonstrate, Richard Branson's Virgin Group's objective is to maximize its proﬁts.
Although it competes against British Airways and British Telecom, British Airways
does not compete against British Telecom as they are from separate industrial
sectors. Similarly, the UK food chain Sainsbury's competes against the local corner
shop and also the UK car insurance ﬁrm Swinton. Conversely, Swinton does not
compete against a local corner shop. Another aspect of competitive behaviour in
the business and social environment is the emergence of new opponents and the
removal of existing ones. Consequently, in this type of environment a player may
engage a multiple number of opponents which can change through time.
This thesis is concerned with extending the GR problem to account for such
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competitive behaviour. In order to do this, it is necessary to adapt the GR problem
so it can be played over networks.
The rest of this chapter has been organized as follows: section 1.1 considers the
background and the mathematical properties of networks, section 1.2 summarizes
the contribution of knowledge that has emerged from this thesis, while section 1.3
provides an outline of the content for the rest of this thesis.
1.1 Background
In 1736, Leonhard Euler became interested in the Königsberg Bridge problem
[Biggs et al (1976)]. The residents of Königsberg, a town consisting of seven
bridges and two islands, considered the problem whether it was possible to cross
all seven bridges in sequence without traversing any bridge more than once (Fig-
ure 1). Euler showed the existence of a path that traversed each bridge once and
only once was impossible. Many consider Euler's proof to be the ﬁrst theorem in
the ﬁeld of graph theory, the mathematical language for describing the properties
of networks.
Figure 1: The town of Königsberg in the eighteenth century. The seven bridges
are highlighted in red [Newman et al (2006)].
In its simplest form, a network can be described as a set of discrete elements
(called vertices/nodes) and a set of connections (deﬁned as links/edges) that
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connect the elements. A node is usually identiﬁed with a number i = 1, . . . , N
whereN is the size of the network (total number of nodes). We will only consider
networks that contain at most one edge joining two nodes. No node is joined to
itself. Where two nodes are connected by an edge they are called neighbouring
nodes. A walk from node i to node j describes the sequence starting from node
i through edges and nodes until node j has been reached. The number of edges
contained in this sequence is deﬁned as the length of the walk. A path is a walk
in which no node is visited more than once. A shortest path is a walk of minimal
length between two nodes. Deﬁning dij as the length of a shortest path between
nodes i and j then the average shortest path length is:
L =
1
N (N − 1)
∑
i,j,i6=j
dij. (1.1.1)
Furthermore, the length of the longest shortest path between any pair of nodes
in the network is called the network's diameter. We illustrate this in Figure 2.
Other simple properties of a network include the degree of the nodes, the degree
distribution, and the clustering coeﬃcient. The degree of a node in a network
is deﬁned as the number of edges the node has to other nodes. The degree
distribution is deﬁned as follows: For k = 1, 2, 3, . . . let P (k) be the probability
that a randomly chosen node of the network has degree k, in other words, the
fraction of nodes in the graph having degree k. Thus if there are N nodes in total
in a network and Nk of them have degree k, then:
P (k) =
Nk
N
. (1.1.2)
The average degree, denoted 〈k〉, is then 〈k〉 =
∞∑
k=1
kP (k). The clustering
coeﬃcient indicates the level of clique formation in the neighbourhood of any
given node. Firstly, the clustering coeﬃcient ci of a node i with the degree ki is
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Figure 2: Simple properties of a Network (a) The Shortest Path (represented by
the blue edges). There are a number of routes from v4 to v7, however the route v4
to v3 to v7 is the shortest. Also v4 to v6 to v7 is another possibility. The diameter
of the two networks is easily seen to be 3 [Albert and Barabási (2002)]. (b) The
Diameter. In the left-hand ﬁgure in which nodes are connected only to their
nearest neighbour the diameter is 8, whilst in the right-hand ﬁgure next-nearest
neighbours are included and the diameter is 4 [Watts (2003)].
deﬁned as follows: Let gedge be the number of edges connecting nodes that are
connected to the node i. The edges connecting these nodes to node i are not
counted. Then:
ci =
2gedge
ki (ki − 1) . (1.1.3)
The clustering coeﬃcient C of the network is then deﬁned to be the average of
all individual clustering coeﬃcients:
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C =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ci. (1.1.4)
Deﬁning triples as sub-networks which contain exactly three nodes,
[Newman et al (2001)] expressed the clustering coeﬃcient as:
C =
3× g∆
gtotal
. (1.1.5)
where g∆ is the number of fully connected triples and gtotal is the total number
of triples in the network. The factor of 3 is present due to the fact that each
triple contains three nodes. Clustering coeﬃcients are further discussed in sec-
tions 1.1.1, 1.1.2 and 1.1.3.
The network's topology is deﬁned as the structure of the network, which
considers properties such as degree distribution, clustering coeﬃecient and average
shortest path length. Diﬀerent classiﬁcations of network topologies include, but
are not limited to, lattice, random, small world and scale free networks. In sections
1.1.1, 1.1.2 and 1.1.3 the diﬀerent type of network topologies are discussed further.
1.1.1 Random Networks
One important class of network topology is a random network. A random net-
work with N nodes and E edges can be generated by randomly selecting, from
a uniform distribution, a pair of unconnected nodes and placing an edge between
them. This is done E times. Alternatively a random network is obtained by con-
necting a pair of unconnected nodes with a given connection probability p. We will
consider the Erd®sRényi model of a random network [Erd®s and Rényi (1959)].
For the Erd®sRényi model, the derived probability for generating a particular
network GN,E with N nodes and exactly E edges is
p (GN,E) = p
E(1− p) 12N(N−1)−E. (1.1.6)
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In order to compute the average degree, it can be observed that the average number
of edges generated in the construction of the network is
〈E〉 = 1
2
N (N − 1) p. (1.1.7)
Since each edge contributes to the degree of two nodes, then the average degree is
〈k〉 = 2 〈E〉
N
= (N − 1) p ≈ Np. (1.1.8)
which is valid for large N . In order to obtain the degree distribution P (k), the
probability of creating a node of degree k is equal to the probability that it is
connected only to k nodes. Moreover, if generating an edge is an independent
event then the probability is simply given by the binomial distribution
P (k) =
 N − 1
k
 pk(1− p)N−1−k. (1.1.9)
As N becomes larger, the binomial distribution can be approximated by the Pois-
son distribution and using Np ≈ 〈k〉
P (k) ≈ e−〈k〉 〈k〉
k
k!
. (1.1.10)
The average clustering coeﬃcient is calculated from this argument. For any node,
the probability that any two of its neighbours are also connected to each other is
given by the connection probability p. Therefore, the average clustering coeﬃcient
is equal to
C = p =
〈k〉
N
. (1.1.11)
Hence, in the Erd®s-Rényi model for ﬁxed 〈k〉 the clustering coeﬃcient decreases
with graph size and approaches zero in the limit of an inﬁnitely large network. As
well as this, random graphs exhibit a small average shortest path length L which
has been shown to vary logarithmically with the network's size N according to:
L ∝ ln (N)
ln (〈k〉) . (1.1.12)
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An interesting property that can be found in the Erd®sRényi model of a ran-
dom network is the existence of a giant component [Newman et al (2006)]. A giant
component is a connected set of nodes that contains a large proportion of the net-
work. Giant components were ﬁrst discussed by [Solomonoﬀ and Rapoport (1951)].
It was found that when the average degree of all the nodes is less than one, the
network is broken into many small islands. Moreover, when the average degree
exceeds one, a giant component is formed that contains a large proportion of all
the nodes in the network.
Figure 3 illustrates this giant component property by ﬁxing the size of the
network and varying the probability of connection between two nodes. In Figure 3
right hand side diagram, it can be seen that one of the nodes is connected to more
than half of the network and these nodes constitute a giant component. Giant
components will be discussed further in Chapter 5.
1.1.2 Small World Networks
The clustering coeﬃcient of the Erd®sRényi model of a random network does not
correlate well with those of real world networks. Most notably, this parameter
vanishes in the limit of very large network sizes. Table 1 illustrates this point by
considering the clustering coeﬃcient for a number of diﬀerent real world networks,
along with the expected value of the clustering coeﬃcient for corresponding random
networks with the same number of nodes and same average degree. We see that
the measured clustering coeﬃcient is much higher than that of the corresponding
random network.
[Watts and Strogatz (1998)] proposed a model which would tune the clustering
coeﬃcient by interpolating between ordered pure ring networks (which have a large
clustering coeﬃcient) and a purely random network (possessing a small average
shortest path length). Hence, Watts and Strogatz initially commenced with a
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Figure 3: Erd®sRényi model of a random network: network size of 10 and prob-
ability of connection between two nodes equal to (upper diagram) 0.025, (middle
diagram) 0.050 and (lower diagram) 0.100.
pure ring network of N nodes in which each node is symmetrically connected to
its m nearest neighbours on either side, so that the average degree 〈k〉 = 2m. An
example of a pure ring 14 noded network with m = 2 is illustrated in Figure 4.
Starting from a pure ring network, Watts and Strogatz obtained a new network
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Network Number Average Measured Random Networks
of nodes Degree Clustering Clustering
Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient
Internet (December 1999) 6374 3.8 0.24 0.00060
World Wide Web 153127 35.2 0.11 0.00023
Power grid 4941 2.7 0.080 0.00054
Biology 1520251 15.5 0.081 0.000010
collaboration
Film actor 449913 113.4 0.20 0.00025
collaboration
Company 7673 14.4 0.59 0.0019
directors
Word co- 460902 70.1 0.44 0.00015
occurrence
Neural network 282 14.0 0.28 0.049
Metabolic network 315 28.3 0.59 0.090
Food web 134 8.7 0.22 0.065
Table 1: Number of nodes, average degree and clustering coeﬃcient for diﬀerent
real world networks, along with the expected value of the clustering coeﬃcient on
a corresponding random graph with the same number of nodes and same average
degree [Newman et al (2006)].
using the following rewiring algorithm. Let us label the nodes v1, . . . , vN . For
convenience we continue the labelling so that vN+1 = v1, vN+2 = v2, . . . etc. For
each node we consider the m edges connecting vi to vi+1, . . . , vi+m. For each
edge we rewire with probability p as follows: We select at random node vj from
one of the nodes vi+m+1, vi+m+2, . . . , vi+N−m−1 that has not already been selected.
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Figure 4: A pure ring 14 nodes network. Each vertex is connected to its nearest
two neighbours on either side of it.
We connect vi to vj and continue to the next edge. Once all the edges have
been considered we continue to the next node vi+1 and repeat. As a result, the
rewiring probability p tunes the level of randomness in the network while keeping
the number of edges constant.
Figure 5 illustrates the inﬂuence of rewiring probabilities of 0.1 and 1.0 re-
spectively. For p = 1, all edges are rewired resulting in a random network (right
diagram of Figure 5). However, for 10−3 ≤ p ≤ 10−1 (i.e. left diagram of Figure 5),
Watts and Strogatz showed that the average shortest path length suddenly drops
while the clustering coeﬃecient remains approximately constant. By the addi-
tion of shortcuts during the rewiring process a small world network is generated.
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Figure 5: The Watts-Strogatz model shows how the topology has changed from
Figure 4 when the rewiring probability p is set to 0.1 (left diagram) and 1.0 (right
diagram).
Small world networks are characterised both by the high clustering coeﬃcient
observed in pure ring networks and the small average shortest path length observed
in random networks. This is illustrated in Figure 6.
The results shown in Figure 6 were obtained by means of numerical simulation.
However, authors such as [Barrat and Weigt (2000)] and [Barthélémy and Amaral (1999)]
investigated the analytical properties of the Watts-Strogatz model. For instance,
[Barrat and Weigt (2000)] showed that the degree distribution of theWatts-Strogatz
model can be expressed as follows:
P (k) =
min(k−〈k〉,〈k〉)∑
n=0
 〈k〉
n
 p〈k〉−n(1− p)n (p 〈k〉)k−〈k〉−n
(k − 〈k〉 − n)!e
−p〈k〉. (1.1.13)
In the limit p→ 1 the above expression reduces to
(〈k〉)k−〈k〉
(k − 〈k〉)!e
−〈k〉. (1.1.14)
This is the Poisson distribution for the variable k′ = k − 〈k〉 with average value
〈k′〉 = 〈k〉.
The rewiring probability, p, also inﬂuences the clustering coeﬃcient and the
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Figure 6: The inﬂuence of the Watts-Stogatz model's rewiring probability, p, on
the normalized clustering coeﬃcient C (p) /C (0) and the average shortest path
length L (p) /L (0). In this example, all the networks consist of 1000 nodes and an
average degree (deﬁned as 〈k〉) of 10 edges [Watts and Strogatz (1998)].
average shortest path length. When p = 0 the average clustering coeﬃcient C is
C =
3 (〈k〉 − 1)
2 (2 〈k〉 − 1) . (1.1.15)
and the shortest average length 〈l〉 ∼ N . For p 6= 0, Barrat derived the average
clustering coeﬃcient as
C (p) ∼= 3 (〈k〉 − 1)
2 (2 〈k〉 − 1)(1− p)
3. (1.1.16)
In investigating the analytical properties of the Watts-Strogatz model,
[Barthélémy and Amaral (1999)] considered varying the network size N as well
as the rewiring probability p. It was noted that the average shortest length
for an one dimensional lattice network is N
2〈k〉 while for a random network it is
log(N)
log(〈k〉) . For example in a network containing 1000 nodes and an average de-
gree of 10 edges, the average shortest length for a one dimensional lattice and
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a random network are 50 and 3 respectively. By varying N and ﬁxing p  1,
[Barthélémy and Amaral (1999)] deﬁned a critical network size N∗ for which a
network topology changes from lattice to a small world network. Moreover, the
shortest average length behaves as
L (p) ∼ N∗F
(
N
N∗
)
. (1.1.17)
where L (p) is proportional to the scaling function F whose independent vari-
able is the ratio
(
N
N∗
)
. Here the scaling factor's limiting behaviour is such that
F (x 1) ∼ x and F (x 1) ∼ log x. In other words for the Watts-Strogatz
model, unlike the clustering coeﬃcient, the average shortest length is inﬂuenced
by both the rewiring probability p and the network size N .
1.1.3 Scale Free Networks
We now turn to an evolving network model that can capture yet more features of
real-world networks. [Barabási and Albert (1999)] argued that the Watts-Strogatz
small world model's degree distribution follows a Poisson distribution, while for
a number of real life networks, such as the worldwide web, the degree distribu-
tion follows a power law. Barabási and Albert's motivation for going beyond the
Watts-Strogatz model was the fact that, in most real networks, new edges are not
located at random but tend to connect to nodes which already have a large num-
ber of connections (a large degree). In other words, Barabási and Albert's model
objectives is to reproduce how a network grow, instead of modelling a network
in its ﬁnal, equilibrium state. Thus, Barabási and Albert considered combining
such preferential attachment conditions with the growing nature of many networks,
deﬁning a simple model based on the following evolutionary rules:
• Growth: The network initially contains a small core of m0 connected nodes.
At every time step a new node, with m edges (m < m0), is added to the
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network.
• Preferential Attachment: Each new edge is connected to an existing node
(node s) with a probability Πs proportional to the degree of that node. This
can be expressed as
Πs =
ks∑
j kj
. (1.1.18)
where kj is the degree of node j and
∑
j kj is the total number of degrees
over the entire network. This model is referred to as the scale free model.
However, according to [Bianconi and Barabási (2001)], in order to derive the
degree distribution for the Barabási and Albert model of a scale free network, the
rate at which a node degree will grow through time needs to be considered. A node
s will increase its degree ks at a rate that is proportional to the probability that
a new node will attach to it. Furthermore, at time t, each new edge contributes
to the total degree with a factor 2. Therefore 2mt edges have been added to the
total of the degrees. Hence we have
∑
j kj = 2mt + m0〈k〉0, where 〈k〉0 is the
average connectivity of the initial core of nodes. Recognising the limitation of
using a continuous equation to model a discrete problem, a diﬀerential equation
that approximates the rate at which a node degree grows can be expressed as
follows:
∂ks (t)
∂t
≈ mks (t)
2mt+m0〈k〉0
. (1.1.19)
Recall that the factor m accounts for the event when each new node adds m edges
to the network. Moreover, considering the boundary condition ks (s) = m in the
limit of a large network, then
ks (t) ∼= m
(
t
s
) 1
2
. (1.1.20)
[Newman et al (2006)] showed the degree distribution at time t is:
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P (k, t) = 2m2
t+ (m0/2m)〈k〉0
t+m0
k−3. (1.1.21)
and in the limit of large sizes t→∞. The solution is therefore
P (k) ' 2m2k−3. (1.1.22)
Thus preferential linking of this form provides a power law degree distribution
with the exponent equal to 3 as the number of nodes added to the network tends
to inﬁnity.
In general, a power law distribution of node degrees suggests a heterogeneous
nature of the network's connectivity, in contrast to bell-shaped (i.e. Poisson)
distributions where the connectivity is homogeneous and the concept of a typical
node can be deﬁned with respect to the average degree 〈k〉. The heterogeneity of
the network's connectivity implies the existence of a large number of nodes that
have few edges and a small number of highly-connected nodes, commonly deﬁned
as hubs. Networks with power law degree distribution are often referred to as
scale free networks to reﬂect the scale invariance of the degree distribution.
According to [Barabási et al (2000)], the average shortest distance for a net-
work generated by the Barabási-Albert model is approximately log(N) for large
N . However, [Bollobás and Riordan (2004)] state that this result is only true
when m (the number of edges of the new node) is equal to one. Conversely,
[Bollobás and Riordan (2004)] showed that when m ≥ 2 then the average shortest
path is approximately
L ≈ log(N)
log log(N)
. (1.1.23)
Consequentially for networks with the same size N and average degree 〈k〉, the
average shortest distance for those which were generated by the Barabási-Albert
model is smaller than those created by Erd®sRényi model [Boccaletti et al (2006)].
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Nevertheless unlike the Watts-Strogatz model, the clustering coeﬃcient is not in-
dependent of the network size N and according to [Boccaletti et al (2006)] is ap-
proximately N−
3
4 . In other words, as the network size N increases, the clustering
coeﬃcient C will tend to 0. In addition to this, the clustering coeﬃcient is lower in
comparison with many real life networks. To address this, [Yan et al (2004)] argue
for a self-organized model of a scale free network. Similarly to the Barabási-Albert
model, Yan et al's approach considered a network that consist of a small number
of nodes that are connected with each other. The attachment rules are as follows:
1. At each time step a new node s is added to the network. However, it only
connects to m randomly selected nodes.
2. The node s connects to the neighbours of the nodes that it connected to in
the previous step, with probability q. For the next J  1 steps (J is a ﬁxed
integer), node s executes a similar operation.
This approach leads to the generation of a scale free network whose clustering
coeﬃcient is more representative of a real world network. Figure 7 illustrates the
schematics of the attachment rule. Figure 8 shows that, for a given size of network
N and tuning the probability q and the ﬁxed integer J , a scale free network can be
generated with a higher clustering coeﬃcient. In this case m =2, q = 0.06 and J =
1, and the clustering coeﬃcient of the Yan's model is at least four times as much
as the Barabási-Albert model. In comparison [Holme and Kim (2002)] discusses a
model that generates a scale free network with a high clustering coeﬃcient of up
to 0.5 with m = 3. However in this case, the Holme-Kim method generates the
scale free network through preferential attachment and then by triad formation.
Triad formation is when new node connects randomly (with a probability q) to
one of its new neighbour's neighbours. Nevertheless, the new node and its new
neighbour's neighbour must not be already connected otherwise another node is
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Figure 7: The approach of [Yan et al (2004)] to the preferential attachment rule
in order to develop a scale free network with a high clustering coeﬃcient. A new
node is introduced at each time step and will connect randomly to an existing node
but with a probability q to that node's neighbours at the next time step. The left,
middle and right networks represent three consecutive time steps. Here node 7 is
introduced at the ﬁrst time step. The successive time steps show the growth in
the number of node 7's neighbours. Nodes 8 and 9 are shown to have arrived but
the process of connecting to the network is omitted from this ﬁgure. In the second
time step, the dash lines extending from node 7 show which nodes it might attach
to with a probability of q. It is seen later that node 4 was the only one selected
for connection. In the ﬁnal step, node 4's neighbours are now to be considered for
connection to node 7. This again is also shown by the dash lines.
chosen preferentially in the network. The modelling of real life networks and
especially the dynamical processes that take place on them [Barrat et al (2008)]
will be discussed further in Chapter 2.
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Figure 8: Comparison of the Barabási-Albert (BA) and Yan's model clustering
coeﬃcient for varying network sizes N . In this case m =2, q = 0.06 and J = 1
[Yan et al (2004)].
1.2 Contribution to Knowledge
By extending the GR problem, in order for it to be played over networks, there
have been a number of contributions to current knowledge. A summary of the
contributions is given below:
1. To demonstrate the value of modelling a complex system with an underly-
ing network topology, a numerical simulation model was developed. Based
on the works of social segregation [Schelling (1971)], this model considered
the process of the separation of two political groups over a social network
where the maximum number of acquaintances was limited. The results are
presented in section 2.2.1.
2. A novel payment mechanism for the GR problem is proposed in order for this
game to be played over networks. However, this payment mechanism is still
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consistent with the classical andN -player GR problem [Rocha and Stern (2004)].
The methodology is presented in section 3.2 and it is possibly the ﬁrst time
the GR problem has been adapted to be played over networks.
3. In order to model how businesses preferentially connect to each other, a
bespoke attachment rule called kudos was developed. The methodology is
illustrated in section 5.3. Furthermore, for the kudos preferential attachment
rule, the network topology undergoes a distinctive phase transition when the
player's target is increased. This does not occur for the degree dependent or
randomly selected preferential attachment rules. The results are presented
in section 5.3.2.
4. A scaling law for the Extended GR problem was developed and the rela-
tionship between it and the critical targets was investigated. The eﬀect of
varying a number of parameters to the scaling law was also explored. The
results are presented in section 5.3.3
1.3 Thesis Outline
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the
concept of an evolutionary rule which examines the current state of a complex
system/game and then indicates what will happen next. Several examples are
presented where the evolutionary rules have been adapted so the game can be
played over networks.
Chapter 3 reviews a variety of GR problems, including the classical and the N -
player. Following on from this, two extended network versions of the GR problem
are presented: the contracting and ﬁxed models.
Chapter 4 addresses the limitations of the contracting and ﬁxed models by
introducing a third variation: the evolving model. Here, the concept of oﬀspring
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is discussed and all three models are compared.
Chapter 5 considers a bespoke preferential attachment rule based on competi-
tive behaviour called kudos. An evaluation of how the kudos preferential attach-
ment rule inﬂuences the GR problem as well as the evolving network topology will
be discussed.
The thesis concludes in Chapter 6, with a summary of the ﬁndings and sug-
gestions for future work.
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2 Models of Complex Systems played over Net-
works
According to [Weaver (1948)] the term complex system refers to problems that
involve dealing simultaneously with a sizeable number of factors which are inter-
related into an organic whole. In addition to this, [Barabási (2009)] argues the
importance of networks to complex systems by stating that:
The underlying connectivity has such a strong impact on a system's behaviour
that no approach to complex systems can succeed unless it exploits the underlying
system's connectivity.
For instance, in the ﬁeld of mathematical epidemiology [Bailey (1975)] it was
believed that a virus would eventually die out if its transition rate was below a
certain epidemic threshold. However, [Pastor-Satorras et al (2001)] demonstrated,
taking the example of a computer viruses, that network topology inﬂuences the
epidemic threshold. Their results implied that the higher the nodes' connectivity
the smaller the epidemic threshold. Furthermore [Pastor-Satorras et al (2001)]
showed that, in the case of a scale free network, there is an absence of an epidemic
threshold meaning that in this case a virus may never completely die out.
In this thesis, we are concerned with a model of a complex system and as-
sociated network topology that inﬂuence each other simultaneously. Firstly, in
this chapter we consider an example of a complex system and the type of models
used to model it. Secondly, a complex system which incorporates the underlying
network topology will be considered.
2.1 Models of Complex Systems
The notion of a complex system is not necessarily limited to physical applications
but can also help us understand the dynamics of social behaviours too. Models
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of the dynamics of social behaviour can be represented by evolutionary rules. To
clarify, an evolutionary rule examines the current state of the complex system
and then indicates what will happen next. Therefore, we use evolutionary rules
but speciﬁcally those that have a mixture of deterministic and stochastic elements.
To illustrate this, [Schelling (1971)] used evolutionary rules to model social segre-
gation. In this context, segregation is deﬁned as the process of separating two or
more groups from each other. Schelling's model represented this social behaviour
by having two coloured types of individuals living on a chessboard city with the
capacity to change their place of living if they did not like the colour of their
neighbours. Schelling demonstrated that if individuals have a mild preference for
neighbours of the same colour then complete segregation may occur at the city
scale.
Schelling produced two models of this complex system: a one- and a two-
dimensional segregation version. In the ﬁrst model, an individual is randomly
positioned along a straight line. There are not any blank spaces on this straight
line, so every individual will have a neighbour. An individual is happy if a certain
proportion of its neighbours located within a speciﬁed radius from its location
are the same colour as itself. For instance, consider the case where there are
two racial groups represented by circles and crosses, as shown in Figure 9. In
this example, the individual assesses the neighbours that are within two places of
its location. The individual's preference is to have more than 50 percent of its
neighbours within that deﬁned radius from the same racial group as itself. As can
be seen in Figure 9, the red circle indicates that this individual is unhappy because
only one of its four neighbours is a circle. In contrast, the green circle indicates
that this individual is happy because the majority of its neighbours are circles.
Furthermore, each unhappy individual moves by simply inserting itself between two
other individuals in a place in which it would be happy. However, as a consequence
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of this action other individuals' states may change from happy to unhappy resulting
in them moving. As a result, this procedure may go on indeﬁnitely or reach
an equilibrium. In a variation of Schelling's work, [Benito et al (2009)] allowed
Figure 9: Schelling's one-dimensional segregation model [Schelling (1971)]. The
circles and crosses represent two diﬀerent racial groups. Here the individual
prefers to live in a neighbourhood where the majority are of the same racial type.
The red circle is an individual wishing to move while the green circle is content
with its location.
an individual who is unhappy to only move one site to the right (in doing so
they might remain unhappy). In Benito's model periodic boundary conditions are
imposed. To illustrate, Figure 10 demonstrates two results of Benito's approach.
A cell is occupied by an individual who is either of type black or type white. The
rows moving downwards indicate how the location of each individual has changed
through time. An individual is only happy if one of its neighbours either side of
it is of the same colour. From Figure 10, it can be seen that segregation emerges
from this simple evolutionary rule where the individual has a mild preference to
relocate to be close to individuals of the same colour. In addition to this, note that
some individuals become happy without moving. This is because the movement
of others inﬂuences them directly, transforming their neighbourhoods in ways that
satisfy their demands in terms of their neighbours' colour/type. We recognise this
model as an example of a cellular automaton [Wolfram (2002)], a much-studied
class of discrete time, discrete space systems.
Schelling also proposed a two-dimensional version of the same model. For
Schelling's original two-dimensional model, the evolutionary rules are as follows:
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Figure 10: Cellular automata version of Benito's variation of Schelling's one-
dimensional segregation model. The top example has 23 black individuals and
27 white individuals. The lower example has 32 black individuals and 29 white
individuals. In both cases an individual is happy if one of its neighbours either
side is of the same type [Benito et al (2009)].
1. The city is a grid of cells and each cell's neighbourhood has a 3 by 3 square
around it, truncated by the city boundaries if close to them.
2. The city is populated by individuals, each belonging to one of two types of
groups of equal size. Here they are called Blue and Green.
3. The initial distribution of the individuals across the grid is random, but there
is a fraction of vacant cells not occupied by either Blue or Green individuals.
This is a departure from the one-dimensional version.
4. At every iteration, every individual calculates the fraction f of its neighbours
that are of its own type (friends) within its neighbourhood (empty places are
ignored).
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5. A threshold value, Ψ, is deﬁned of the fraction of friends within the neigh-
bourhood. This is common to all individuals. Any individual located at
the centre of the neighbourhood where f < Ψ decides to leave the cell and
relocate to the closest empty cell satisfying the condition f > Ψ.
6. Information about any cell changes by an individual immediately becomes
available to all other individuals.
[Laurie and Jaggi (2003)] and [Benenson et al (2009)] developed a variation of this
model with the inclusion of an additional rule such that if none of the vacant cells
satisfy the condition f > Ψ, then an individual may move to the closest empty
cell. [Benenson et al (2009)] concluded that there is little diﬀerence between a
randomly generated residential pattern and one which was created through time by
the model when there is a weak tendency to reside in a friendly neighbourhood (low
Ψ). However, a segregated residential pattern did emerge when there is a strong
tendency to reside in a friendly neighbourhood (high Ψ). Figure 11 shows one
case where the residential pattern appears random while the other case contains
one or more homogeneous patches of Blue and Green individuals separated by
unpopulated boundaries. Unpopulated cells are shown in black.
2.2 How Networks Inﬂuence the Behaviour of Complex Sys-
tems and Evolutionary Games
There are a number of examples of models of complex systems that incorporate an
underlying network topology. For instance, [Barrat et al (2008)] discuss models of
rumour and information spreading as well as opinion formation. In these exam-
ples, the network topology inﬂuences the behaviour of the complex system. On
the other hand, [Fan and Chen (2004)] and [Gong and van Leeuwen (2003)] con-
sidered models where the complex system also inﬂuenced the network topology.
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Figure 11: Schelling's two-dimensional segregation model; here 5 percent of space
is free, which an unhappy individual can move into. The diﬀerence between case
(a) and (b) is that the thresholds Ψ are 20 percent and 80 percent respectively. In
case (a) the residential pattern cannot be distinguished from a random one, while
in case (b) the residential pattern is a segregated one [Benenson et al (2009)].
In both papers, each node's property included an output value calculation from
its own logistic map equation plus a weighted average value of the other nodes
connected to it. Moreover, new nodes would attach preferentially to the existing
nodes. Hence, the complex model inﬂuences the network topology but the network
topology also inﬂuences the complex model.
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2.2.1 Schelling's Model with Underlying Network Topology
Section 2.1 discussed the complex system that is Schelling's model of social segre-
gation; as well as this, it also deﬁned segregation as the process of separating two
or more groups. An important element of this is an individual is deﬁned as happy
if a certain percentage of its surrounding neighbours are of the same type, such as
nationality, class, religion or racial grouping; otherwise the individual is deﬁned
as unhappy and tries to move to another location. For example, an individual
may wish to live in an area with individuals of the same racial or religious group
as itself and move if these conditions are not met. However, consider the segre-
gation of a social network group such as those that occur in Facebook as opposed
to geographical locations; in this circumstance the network topology becomes an
important element.
[Fagiolo et al (2009)] developed a version of the Schelling's model to accommo-
date the underlying network topology. Fagiolo deﬁned two types of moves: global
or local. Global implies that the individual can move to anywhere in the network
where there is an empty node (space). Local implies that the individual can only
move within a certain distance of its current location if there is an empty node
within that region; if not, then it remains at its current location. Fagiolo decided,
however, that the individual could move from its current location to an available
location without being aﬀected by the topology of the network. Fagiolo stated
that:
This implies that average path length has no [eﬀect] whatsoever on the dynamic
process leading to segregation. A way we can vary a network's average path length
in a Watts-Strogatz model is to vary the rewire probability [Fagiolo et al (2009)]
Nevertheless, to investigate this further, we adapted the rules for Schelling's
model of social segregation to the following:
1. The number of individuals of type 1 and 2, the number of empty spaces, the
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network topology and the threshold tolerance are chosen.
2. The individuals and empty spaces are randomly assigned to a node within
the network.
3. At each time step, an unhappy individual is chosen at random and is moved
to the nearest empty node.
The greatest diﬀerence between Fagiolo's Global model and the above approach
is rule 3. In the earlier approach, the randomly selected unhappy individual is
only allowed to move within a certain distance from its location, while in Fagiolo's
Global model, an individual can move to any randomly selected empty node within
the network. Figure 12 gives an example that illustrates the initial state of a social
group of friends where the network topology is a pure ring. The blue nodes are
those that support the blue party and the red nodes are those that support the
red party. However in this example, an individual desires to have at least 75
percent of its neighbours (social group) support the same party as itself. In this
example there are 50 supporters of each party and 15 empty positions. Under
the circumstances described, 86 out of the 100 individuals are unhappy with their
current social group. In Figure 13, the above rule is repeated 1000 times and
it can be seen that the two groups become more segregated. Furthermore, the
number of individuals that are unhappy with their social group is now 3 out of
100. Figure 14 illustrates this exercise repeated over a Watts-Strogatz network but
with diﬀerent rewiring probabilities. From Figure 14 it is observed that the pure
ring network (rewiring probability of zero) after 1000 rounds has the least number
of unhappy individuals and hence the greatest segregation of the two groups. As
the rewiring probability increases the rate of segregation becomes slower and the
level of segregation decreases as there are more unhappy individuals within their
current social group. Hence, by adapting Fagiolo's rules it is observed that there
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Figure 12: Initial state of a social group; 50 individuals support the red party
and 50 support the blue party. The empty cells indicate an empty vacancy or
position within the social network. Every individual would prefer to have at least
75 percent of its neighbours supporting the same party as itself. Here 86 out of
the 100 individuals are unhappy with their current social group as the previously
stated criterion is not being met.
is an inﬂuence on network topology that aﬀects the behaviour of the complex
system. The potential problem shown by Fagiolo was that the inﬂuence of the
network topology on the complex system was limited unless the evolutionary rules
were varied.
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Figure 13: The state of a social group after 1000 individual movements to the
nearest empty vacancy; 50 individuals support the red party and 50 support the
blue party. Every individual would prefer to have at least 75 percent of neighbours
who support the same party as itself. Here 3 out of the 100 individuals are unhappy
with their current social group as the previously stated criterion is not being met.
2.2.2 Evolutionary Games
The ﬁeld of evolutionary game theory [Szabo and Fath (2007)] explores how play-
ers choose to cooperate or compete against each other. Through time, a player
may change their strategy in order to achieve a certain objective. Models of
this behaviour can incorporate the underlying network topology; for example,
[Eguiluz and Zimmerman (2005)] and [Nowak and May (1992)] considered itera-
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Figure 14: The inﬂuence of a Watts-Strogatz model's rewiring probability p on the
number of unhappy individuals within a social group network throughout the sim-
ulation duration of 1000 rounds. An unhappy individual is someone who does not
have at least 75 percent of neighbours who support the same party as itself. The
lower the number of unhappy individuals the more segregated the social network
is.
tive prisoner's dilemma problems played over a Watts-Strogatz network. In these
papers, the player adopts a strategy and depending on their neighbours' strategies
receives a certain payoﬀ (score). Furthermore, after a certain number of rounds,
the player may wish to review their strategy and adopt a neighbour's approach if
they have a greater payoﬀ. As well as this, [Gómez-Gardeñes et al (2008)] consid-
ered how this evolutionary game aﬀected the topology of networks by introducing
new players who preferentially attach depending on existing players' payoﬀs.
Another evolutionary game theory model developed by
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[Southwell and Cannings (2010)] explored a variation of the iterative prisoner's
dilemma which is based on an animal social network. In their model, the successful
players reproduce in the summer and the weak ones die in the winter. Therefore,
they introduce a new concept of successful players having oﬀspring. Successful
players having oﬀspring is an important theme and will be discussed in greater
depth in Chapters 4 and 5. In addition to this, within their model, the oﬀspring
adopt the same strategy as their parent and share their parent's neighbours. In
this way the model is mimicking how a newborn inherits their parent's genes and
environment.
The evolutionary rules are as follows. Each player employs one of a number of
diﬀerent strategies, which, unlike most other iterative dilemma models, remains
ﬁxed throughout the duration of the game. The players' payoﬀ per round is de-
pendent on their neighbours' strategy and the respective payoﬀ related to that
strategy. Throughout the duration of the game, the player's payoﬀ from each
round is accumulated into a total points score. Irrespective of the strategy, all
payoﬀ combinations are set to equal −1. Therefore, in each round a player's total
points score will be reduced by the number of neighbours they are connected to.
The model states that in each round:
• The player is removed from the network if their total points score is less than
or equal to Q (where Q is a positive integer).
• Otherwise, the player has one oﬀspring. The oﬀspring will be connected to
the parent as well as the parent's neighbours in the next round.
As a consequence, any player only remains in the network for a ﬁnite time (no
more than Q rounds).
Unlike previous models of networks, the network in their model will grow and
break into sub networks. The theme of networks evolving and fracturing is a
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concept that will be explored in Chapter 4. The networks not only break but
self-replicate. This means that, after a ﬁnite number of steps, the network will
not evolve to its original topology but will create multiple separate versions of
that topology. Figure 15 illustrates this point. In this example, starting with an
isolated node and Q = 4, the schematic diagram represents the ﬁrst six time steps
of their model and how the connected structures produce one another. Each row
working downwards represents the next time step. Every box in the row represents
the network topology produced at that time step. By the fourth time step, the
model has self replicated the original topology four times.
 
Figure 15: Schematic diagram representing how connected structures produce one
another in Southwell's model for the ﬁrst six time steps starting with an isolated
node where Q = 4 [Southwell and Cannings (2010)].
[Southwell and Cannings (2010)] do not discuss scale free networks, small world
networks or clustering coeﬃcients. Nor do they try to measure any other properties
of their evolving network. This is due to the fact that their main motivation is
to model how an animal social network changes over time. When new oﬀspring
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are born they will share resources with their parents and their parents' associates.
When an individual shares its resources with too many other individuals it starves
and dies. In essence, the key question that they are addressing is how the behaviour
of the players aﬀects the topology of the network. This is an important theme and
will be discussed in greater detail in Chapters 3 and 4.
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3 Extending the Gambler's Ruin Problem
The GR problem will be discussed at length in this chapter. In the original GR
problem two or more players compete for each other's resources until ultimately
a player is ruined (i.e. they lose all of their resources). Subsequently, this proba-
bility model has had a number of variants, for example, the classical GR problem
which will be considered together with its origins and its properties. We shall
note the analytical solution of the N -player GR problem that was derived by
[Rocha and Stern (2004)] showing the relationship between the initial resources of
the players and the time it takes for an individual player to become ruined.
In Rocha's version of the N -player GR problem all players play each other. In
other words, the game is conducted over a fully connected network. However, in
this thesis we will describe a version of the GR problem that can be played over
any type of network topology and we shall investigate how the game inﬂuences the
network topology and, conversely, how the network topology inﬂuences the game.
3.1 Classical Gambler's Ruin Problem
The origins of the GR problem can be attributed to correspondence in 1656 be-
tween Blaise Pascal and Pierre de Fermat. The original problem was posed in this
way:
Let two men play with three dice, the ﬁrst player scoring a point whenever
11 is thrown, and the second whenever 14 is thrown. But instead of the points
accumulating in the ordinary way, let a point be added to a player's score if his
opponent's score is nil, but otherwise let it instead be subtracted from his opponent's
score. It is as if opposing points form `pairs', and annihilate each other, so that
the trailing player always has zero points. The winner is the ﬁrst to reach twelve
points; what are the relative chances of each player winning? [Edwards (1983)]
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In 1657, the Dutch mathematician, Christiaan Huygens adapted the problem
in his book De Ratiociniis in Aleae Ludo (On Reasoning in Games of Chance)
[Shoesmith (1986)]. Huygens proposed that each player starts with twelve points.
A win for a player would result in a transfer of a resource from their opponent to
themselves. The overall winner would be the player who bankrupts the other of
all their resources. Eventually, Huygen's adaption became the GR problem.
3.1.1 Properties of the Two Player Gambler's Ruin Problem
In this we section consider the properties of the most well understood GR problem:
the two player game. The two player game is deﬁned as follows:
Let two players each have a ﬁnite number of resources (say, a for player one and
b for player two). Now, ﬂip a coin with each player having 50 percent probability
of winning, and transfer a resource from the loser to the winner. Now repeat the
process until one player has all the resources. What are the probabilities of each
player winning and how long will the game last for? [Ore (1953)]
The two player game can be extended to incorporate a biased as opposed to
an unbiased coin. Moreover, the two player game can be extended to encompass
a player having a speciﬁc upper target to gain. If the player achieves that upper
target then the game is halted.
To consider the analytical solution, a player starts with an initial number of
resources, a which will increase by one unit with probability p, and decrease by
one unit with probability 1-p. The process stops when the player achieves a + b
resources or becomes bankrupt (i.e. loses all of their resources).
Denoting time to achieve (expected duration of the game) by TTA, the proba-
bility pa of a player gaining b resources before losing a resources is [Hadjiliadis (2004)]
pa =

( 1−pp )
a−1
( 1−pp )
a+b−1
p 6= 1
2
a
a+b
p = 1
2
.
(3.1.1)
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and the expected duration of the game is
TTA =

a
1−2p − a+b1−2p ×
( 1−pp )
a−1
( 1−pp )
a+b−1
p 6= 1
2
ab p = 1
2
.
(3.1.2)
To illustrate this further, Table 2 considers two numerical examples: ﬂipping an
unbiased and a biased coin. As can be seen there is almost zero probability of
achieving the target when the probability of winning a round is 0.42. To investigate
Probability of Probability of Expected duration
winning a round achieving target of game
Biased coin 0.42 10−14 625
Unbiased coin 0.50 0.50 10,000
Table 2: The eﬀect of using a biased or unbiased coin on the probability of achieving
the target (200 units) as well as the expected duration of the game. a=b=100 units.
this further, a number of numerical simulations were undertaken using the software
tool Mathematica. The simulation was repeated 10,000 times (this is deﬁned as
the number of histories). Figure 16, for a biased coin, illustrates that a game
duration can vary from 250 to 1500 rounds. However, the average duration is
close to the expected value of 625. In Figure 17 four out of the total number
of histories has been selected to showcase how the resources of the representative
player vary over the rounds. Indeed, in these four diﬀerent cases it is observed that
the duration is approximately 600 rounds. Moreover, Figure 16 shows that any
duration is possible, Additionally, Table 2 shows the second scenario where the
coin is unbiased. From the two player numerical simulation results in Figure 18,
it is apparent that in some exceptional cases the game can vary beyond 80,000
rounds even though the expected duration is 10,000. Figure 19 demonstrates
that in two out of the four histories showcased, the game ﬁnishes beyond 10,000
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Figure 16: Frequency distribution of the expected duration of a game with the
given scenario of ﬂipping a biased coin with probability 0.42 of landing on one side
(Table 2). 10,000 histories were undertaken. a=b=100 units.
rounds. Nonetheless, Table 3 reveals that the numerical simulation (with 10,000
histories) has an expected duration of 10,115.40 (2 dp) rounds which is just above
1 percent away from the analytical solution. The biased coin scenario in Table 3
demonstrates that the numerical simulation for expected duration is 623.90 (2 dp)
in comparison to the actual analytical solution of 625.00 (2dp).
3.1.2 The N-Player Gambler's Ruin Problem
Papers written by [Chang (1995)] and [Sandell (1989)] described analytical solu-
tions for problems that go beyond the two player game. Furthermore,
[Rocha and Stern (1999)] discussed an analytical solution for a general N -player
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Figure 17: A numerical simulation of how a player's resources vary with each round
in four diﬀerent histories (cases 1 to 4) with the given scenario of ﬂipping a biased
coin with probability 0.42 of landing on one side (Table 2). a=b=100 units.
Analytical Numerical Simulation
Expected duration of game Predicted duration of game
Biased coin 625.00 623.90
Unbiased coin 10,000.00 10,115.40
Table 3: Comparison between analytical and numerical simulations for the ex-
pected duration of a game. Results are accurate to two decimal places. The
number of histories for the numerical simulation is 10,000. The initial resource for
the two players is 100 with a target of 200.
game. Rocha and Stern's version of the GR problem encompasses similar objec-
tives to the two player game, namely expected duration to ruin and individual
probabilities of ruin. Denoting time to bankruptcy (expected duration to ruin) by
TTB, their problem can be stated as follows:
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Figure 18: Frequency distribution of the expected duration of a game with the
given scenario of ﬂipping an unbiased coin with probability 0.5 of landing on one
side (Table 2). 10,000 histories were undertaken. a=b=100 units.
Let all N players have an initial and equal resource of I, respectively. In
each round, one player, say player i, is randomly chosen to be the winner with
probability pi , i = 1, ..., N , where p1+...+pN = 1. When the probabilities are equal,
the game is said to be symmetric; otherwise it is asymmetric. The winning player
of the round is paid one resource by each of the other losing players, for a total
gain of n-1 resources for the round. The game continues until the ﬁrst time, TTB,
when one or more of the players are ruined. Of interest is the expected time of ruin
and the individual probabilities of ruin at time TTB [Rocha and Stern (2004)].
For the symmetrical case Rocha derived the following: if I is the initial resource
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Figure 19: A numerical simulation of how a player's resources vary with each
round in four diﬀerent histories (cases 1 to 4) with the given scenario of ﬂipping
an unbiased coin with probability 0.5 of landing on one side (Table 2). a=b=100
units.
for all the players, then the expected duration is
TTB =

I 0 ≤ I ≤ N − 1
N
1−α I = N
1 + N
1−α(N+1)
2
I = N + 1.
(3.1.3)
where α = N !p1p2 . . . pN and 0 ≤ I ≤ N + 1. The players' individual probabilities
of ruin, P (playeri) in the symmetrical case are:
P (playeri) =

(1− pi)I 0 ≤ I ≤ N − 1
(1−pi)I
1−α I = N
(1−pi)I
1−α(n+1)
2
I = N + 1.
(3.1.4)
where p1 = p2 = ... = pN . However [Rocha and Stern (2004)] explored when the
player's initial resource I is more than the number of players N . A special case for
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the expected duration which applied to both the symmetrical and asymmetrical
cases was derived. If the initial resource is partitioned into
I = N + u. (3.1.5)
where u is an arbitrary integer u = 0, 1, 2, 3... and I is the initial resource for all
the players then
lim
N→∞
(TTB − (N + u)) = 0. (3.1.6)
This is important as the above expression indicates a relationship between time
to bankruptcy, number of players and the initial resource; this argument will be
addressed again in sections 3.2.1 and 4.2.
3.2 Gambler's Ruin Problem Played Over Networks
In the previous section we considered the N -player GR problem as described by
[Rocha and Stern (2004)]. In their model there were a number of limiting features,
in particular players did not have targets, the networks was fully connected and
the game ended at the ﬁrst bankruptcy. In this section, we will explore and remove
these limitations. To begin with, we make the following deﬁnitions:
ARound is one iteration of the GR problem where the players compete/gamble
against their opponent or opponents.
A Game is a sequence of rounds until a speciﬁed conclusion has been reached.
A speciﬁc conclusion, for example, can be a certain number of rounds being
played or only one player being left in the network.
For the network version of the GR problem, it must be determined which player
has won a round. Firstly, in order to do this each player will be allocated a score
in every round. This is done as follows:
1. At the start of a game each player is given their own normal distribution. For
each round, the players' scores are sampled from their normal distributions.
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2. The mean of the player's normal distribution is deﬁned as their strength.
3. The scores between two competing players are then compared to establish
who is the winner of this round.
Each player's strength is sampled from a uniform distribution. In this study the
standard deviation remains ﬁxed for each player. Appendix A demonstrates the
robustness of the numerical solution to the choice of standard deviation and other
statistical parameters. The standard deviation was chosen to calibrate with earlier
methodology undertaken in the research.
In order to determine the exchange of resources over this network, the following
payment rule was adopted:
• In each round, a player gives one unit of resource to its highest scoring
neighbour, provided that neighbour scores higher than the player.
• Otherwise the player keeps their resource.
In general, the network version of the GR problem possesses some advantages over
previous methodologies and hence makes it suitable to be played over diﬀerent
network topologies. These advantages are:
1. The tossing of a coin is only suited to a two player game.
2. The game does not need to end when the ﬁrst player becomes bankrupt.
3. The scoring mechanism is linked to the players' strength. The players'
strengths do not need updating when the size of the network changes.
When the network is generated, each player is given an unique identiﬁcation num-
ber. In the unlikely event of a tie, the player with the lowest value identiﬁcation
number obtains the resource. Figure 20 demonstrates an example of the payment
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mechanism. Here there are three players: A, B and C who score 0.8, 0.3 and 0.5
respectively. Player A has scored higher than its neighbours and will not lose any
of its resource. On the other hand, players B and C both lose to A and hence give
it one resource. Player B will give only to its highest scoring neighbour. Hence
player C, despite scoring higher than player B, receives nothing. Figure 21 demon-
 
Figure 20: Example of the payment mechanism rule for three players on a fully
connected network.
strates another example of the payment mechanism. Players A and D do not play
each other but they do have a common neighbour, player C. Both players A and
D have scored higher than player C. However, as player D is player C's highest
scoring neighbour, this player will receive one resource from player C.
For each round, a player's score changes and hence the direction and exchange
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Figure 21: Example of the payment mechanism rule for four players on a non fully
connected network.
of resources between the players may change as well.
In our Extended GR problem each player has a target. If the player achieves
their target, they leave the network. Those who meet or exceed their target as
achievers are deﬁned as achievers and those who lose all of their resources as
bankrupt. Players who do not have any opponents but still have resources are
deﬁned as isolated.
In the following sections two variations of the Extended GR problem, the con-
tracting and the ﬁxed network models, will be introduced.
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3.2.1 The Contracting Model
For the contracting model, a player is removed from the network when they achieve
their target or become bankrupt. In addition to this, any isolated players for
the current round reconnect to the network in the following round by randomly
selecting a prescribed number of existing players. For the numerical simulations,
this value was up to three opponents. A higher number of opponents is explored
in Chapter 5. Nevertheless, the network topology will always evolve to the two
player GR problem. Figure 22 illustrates this point. The left hand diagram shows
the ﬁrst round when the pure ring network consists of 100 players, each having 10
neighbours (opponents). Each player has an initial resource of 100 and a target of
200. After 1000 rounds, the size of the network has reduced from 100 to 53 players.
The topology no longer represents a pure ring network. Furthermore, if players 8
or 13 achieve or become bankrupt, there is the possibility that the network will
become disconnected. After 4751 rounds, the network topology has evolved into
the two player GR problem.
In the previous section we described how [Rocha and Stern (2004)] showed a
relationship between the expected duration to ruin and initial network size. How-
ever, the contracting model equivalent for the expected duration to ruin is the
round in which the ﬁrst player becomes bankrupt. Nonetheless, the contracting
model shares some similar properties to the N -player GR problem. Figure 23
compares Rocha and Stern's fully connected network with the contracting model's
results which are played over a pure ring network. For comparison purposes, two
pure ring networks, where the player has two and ten neighbours respectively, have
been considered. In both cases, in agreement with Rocha and Stern's results, it
is observed that the ﬁrst time to bankruptcy increases with initial network size.
Moreover, it is noted that for the two neighbour case, it takes longer for the ﬁrst
player to become bankrupt. As explained in the previous section, in our version of
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Figure 22: The inﬂuence of the contracting model on network topology. Network
topology is a pure ring, 100 players with 10 neighbours (opponents) each, initial
resource of 100 and a target of 200. (a) This is the ﬁrst round. (b) After 1000
rounds: network topology is no longer a pure ring, the size of the network has
reduced from 100 to 53 players. If players 8 or 13 achieve or become bankrupt,
there is the possibility that the network will become disconnected. (c) After 4751
rounds: network topology has evolved to the two player GR problem.
the Extended GR problem, the game does not cease when the ﬁrst player become
bankrupt. Thus, there is a need to explore the properties of the contracting model
beyond the ﬁrst bankruptcy. Furthermore, it will be of interest to see how such
parameters are inﬂuenced not only by the player's initial resource I and target T
but also by the initial conﬁguration of the network topology.
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Figure 23: The inﬂuence of initial network size N and degree of each player k
on the ﬁrst time to bankruptcy. Comparison of a fully connected network k =
N − 1 [Rocha and Stern (2004)] with two pure ring networks: k = 2 pure ring
network with two neighbours; k = 10 pure ring network with 10 neighbours. Initial
resource I is the numerical value 10 more than the initial network size N . For the
contracting model case, results are averaged over 50 histories. For each game, the
target is set at a large enough value to ensure that there are no achievements.
This is because the [Rocha and Stern (2004)] results do not incorporate players
who achieve.
3.2.2 The Evolving Network Model: The Pure Ring Case
In this section we shall investigate further the properties of the contracting model
on a pure ring network. This may be considered as the Watts-Strogatz model with
rewiring probability p = 0. The inﬂuence of starting with a network generated
by a larger rewiring probability will be discussed in section 3.2.3. Table 4 shows
the network topology cases to be investigated. The ﬁrst property to be considered
is the network size. The Network Size Nr is deﬁned as the number of players
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Cases Size N Neighbours k Initial Resource Target
Case 1 50 2 60 100
Case 2 50 10 60 100
Case 3 100 2 110 200
Case 4 100 10 110 200
Case 5 150 2 160 300
Case 6 150 10 160 300
Case 7 200 2 210 400
Case 8 200 10 210 400
Table 4: The initial network topologies and players' conﬁgurations to be considered
in order to determine their inﬂuences on the results produced by the extended
version of the GR problem. Cases chosen to be consistent with Figure 23.
within the network at a speciﬁed round. It is of interest to see how the network size
for diﬀerent topologies and scenarios change through the game. For each case in
Table 4, Figure 24 shows the normalised network size, as the game progresses. In
each case the game eventually evolves into a two player GR problem. Another two
properties to be considered are the mean time to bankruptcy (MTTB) and mean
time to achievement (MTTA). MTTB and MTTA are deﬁned as the average
number of rounds for players to become bankrupt or to achieve their targets re-
spectively. The motivation for these parameter is to measure how long the players
are expected to remain within the game for diﬀering scenarios. Figure 25 show the
MTTB and MTTA. It is worth pointing out that the results shown in Figure 25
results are consistent with those shown in Figure 23 (TTB ﬁrst to bankruptcy)
inasmuch as there is a steady linear rise in the result with respect to the initial size
of the network. However, the players that have fewer neighbours (opponents) have
a longer MTTB and MTTA. For the classical GR problem, a player is expected
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Figure 24: The normalised network size Nr throughout the game for the cases in
Table 4. Results averaged over 50 histories. The normalised player per resource
is calculated from its respected value for a round, divided by the initial ﬁgure for
round 1.
to either achieve or become bankrupt; with probability 1 they will not continue
playing forever [Stern (1975)].
A key theme for this thesis is how a player's degree changes throughout the
game. This is because the player's degree through time gives an indication how
the network topology is evolving. Denoting the Exit Degree as the number of
neighbours the player is connected to when they are about to leave the game
through achievement or bankruptcy and Entrance Degree as the number of
neighbours the player is connected to when they start playing the game, we are
able to observe the how the player's degree evolves. Figure 26 show the inﬂuence
the entrance degree and initial network size N have on the exit degree. This ﬁgure
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Figure 25: Inﬂuence of initial network size N and neighbours k on the mean time
to bankruptcyMTTB (left diagram) and mean time to achievementMTTA (right
diagram). Initial network topology: pure ring network. Initial resource: 10 more
than the numerical size of the network. Target: double the numerical size of the
network. Results averaged over 50 histories.
demonstrates that in all cases the exit degree remains steady over the diﬀerent
sizes of networks. However in both ﬁgures, the players with an entrance degree of
10 undergo a greater decline to their exit degree than the players with an entrance
degree of 2. Furthermore, the exit degree for achievers is higher than those who
become bankrupt; this is more apparent when the entrance degree is 10.
As stated in section 3.2 every player is given a mean strength sampled from
a uniform distribution. However, as the players start to leave the network, the
average strength of the existing players might change. The Average Strength is
simply the average of all the players' strengths within the network. Figure 27 shows
how the initial network size, number of neighbours, initial resources and target
inﬂuence the average strength of the network, utilizing the cases documented in
Table 4. Generally, it is noted that in most cases there is an immediate decrease in
average strength after which there is a steady rise to approximately the value of 0.5.
However, case 1 (initial network size of 50 and number of neighbours of 2) presents
diﬀerently as it steadily converges to a value just over 0.4. This may be due to
the relative size of this network and a higher proportion of the strongest players
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Figure 26: Inﬂuence of initial network size N and entrance degree on the exit k
(exit degree) of players who became bankrupt (left diagram) and who achieved
(right diagram). Initial network topology: pure ring network. Initial resource: 10
more than the numerical size of the network. Target: double the numerical size of
the network. Results averaged over 50 histories.
achieving prematurely during the game. The gain loss parameter is deﬁned as the
diﬀerence between the total resources acquired to achieve by the achieving group of
players and the total resources lost by the bankrupt group of players respectively.
This parameter is updated every time a player leaves the game. The gain loss
parameter provides a metric that could indicate which network topology is the
more suitable for players to achieve. Figure 28 shows how the initial network
size, number of neighbours, initial resources and target inﬂuences the gain loss
parameter of the network, again utilizing the cases documented in Table 4. Notably
in case 8, where the size of the network is 200 and the number of neighbours is 10, it
is observed that at ﬁrst there is a rapid rise in the gain of the network, followed by
a loss. This is due to a large number of players achieving and leaving the network,
followed by those who become bankrupt. Moreover, for the same case another
oscillation is observed at approximately the 2, 000 round mark. Finally, resource
per player is deﬁned as the total of the resources in the network divided by the
number of players within the network. This parameter measures how competitive
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Figure 27: The inﬂuence of initial network size, degree, initial resources and tar-
get (Table 4) on the average player's strength (average strength) in the network
throughout the game. Results averaged over 50 histories.
a game has become due to, for example, a decrease in the total resource in the
network because of achievement. Figure 29 illustrates how the initial network size,
number of neighbours, initial resources and target inﬂuence the resource per player
of the network utilizing the cases documented in Table 4. An interesting result
is found in the smaller networks N = 50 (case 1 and 2) where the resource per
player parameter reacts more sensitively to the number of neighbours. For case
1 (two neighbours), the normalised resource per player reduces to approximately
0.8 of its initial value while for case 2 (10 neighbours) it increases to 1.4. This
suggests that for the contracting model, the player with a higher degree exhibits
a shorter MTTB which is consistent with the results observed in Figure 25.
To conclude, this section has considered diﬀerent key parameters to indicate
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Figure 28: The inﬂuence of initial network size, degree, initial resources and target
(Table 4) on the gain loss parameter (GainLoss) of the network throughout the
game. Results averaged over 50 histories.
how the network evolves under the inﬂuence in our extended version of the GR
problem. As well as this, the question of how the extended version of the GR prob-
lem itself has been inﬂuenced by generic network properties was also considered.
3.2.3 The Eﬀect of the Watts-Strogatz Model's Rewiring Probability
In section 3.2.1, we showed the inﬂuence of the Watts-Strogatz model's rewiring
probability p on the number of unhappy individuals within a social group network
as an example how a game can be inﬂuence by its network topology. In the previous
section we discussed the properties of the contracting model played over a pure ring
network. In this section, however, we will explore how those properties may alter
when we increase the Watts-Strogatz model's rewiring probabilities. According to
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Figure 29: The inﬂuence of initial network size, degree, initial resources and tar-
get (Table 4) on the normalised resource per player parameter of the network
throughout the game. Results averaged over 50 histories.
[Newman and Watts (1999)], the region for which the network crosses over from
pure ring to small world is approximately p = 1
N×k . For all the cases in Table 4,
we have chosen a rewiring probability of p = 0.1 to ensure that these networks
indeed fall into the small world region. As well as this, we have chosen the rewiring
probability of p = 1.0 to represent random networks.
Firstly we will investigate the inﬂuence the initial network size and player's
degree has on the numbers of players throughout the game for varying network
topologies. Figure 24 illustrated the pure ring network. However, Figure 30 shows
the results from repeating the numerical simulations on small world and random
network topologies respectively. Notably, it was observed that all the three initial
topologies for the contracting model converges to a two player GR problem. Cases
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1 and 2: initial network size of 50 players show the most rapid decline for the
three diﬀerent network topologies. Figure 30 shows that case 5: initial network
size of 150 players and two neighbours before rewiring and case 7: initial network
size of 200 players and two neighbours before rewiring have the slowest decline as
opposed to case 8: initial network size of 200 players and 10 neighbours. Indeed it
is presumed that this is a result of the rewiring functionality of the Watts-Strogatz
model.
Figure 30: The inﬂuence of initial network size, degree, initial resources and target
(Table 4) on the normalised network size Nr throughout the game for the network
generated by the Watts-Strogatz model p = 0.1 (left diagram) and p = 1.0 (right
diagram). Results averaged over 50 histories.
Now we will investigate the inﬂuence the initial network size and player's degree
have on the average strength throughout the game for varying network topologies.
Figure 27 demonstrated the pure ring network while Figure 31 represents the small
world and random network topologies respectively. In comparing the three diﬀer-
ent topologies, it is observed that there are a number of similarities between the
pure ring and small world network topologies. For instance, the average strength
for each topology in most cases approaches a steady state. As in the pure ring
topology, the case 1 average strength converges to a value of approximately 0.42
for these topologies. In contrast, in the random network topology, the average
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strength in some cases converges to a slighter higher value. This suggests that
for the random network topology, the stronger players remain longer in this game
than weaker opponents. By repeating the gain loss parameter exercise in Figure 28
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Figure 31: The inﬂuence of initial network size, degree, initial resources and target
(Table 4) on the average strength throughout the game for the network generated
by the Watts-Strogatz model p = 0.1 (left diagram) and p = 1.0 (right diagram).
Results averaged over 50 histories.
for the small world and the random networks, it can be seen that each result is
largely the same (Figure 32). Case 8: initial network size of 200 players and 10
neighbours oscillates for all network topologies with its second peak occurring at
approximately round 2000, but decaying to zero value after about 4000 rounds.
However, this is not the case for the small world network, as the average strength
becomes approximately zero after about 6000 rounds.
The resource per player parameters have previously been discussed in terms
of the inﬂuence the pure ring network topology had on this parameter as demon-
strated in Figure 29. This will now be compared and contrasted with the small
world and the random networks (Figure 33). There is little signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between the network topologies.
The main conclusion that can be drawn is that, despite the diﬀering network
topologies, the contracting model always evolves to a two player GR problem.
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Figure 32: The inﬂuence of initial network size, degree, initial resources and target
(Table 4) on the gain loss parameter (GainLoss) throughout the game for the
network generated by the Watts-Strogatz model p = 0.1 (left diagram) and p = 1.0
(right diagram). Results averaged over 50 histories.
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Figure 33: The inﬂuence of initial network size, degree, initial resources and target
(Table 4) on the normalised parameter resource per player throughout the game
for the network generated by the Watts-Strogatz model p = 0.1 (left diagram) and
p = 1.0 (right diagram). Results averaged over 50 histories.
As well as this for the global parameters described in this section, there appears,
surprisingly, to be little signiﬁcance diﬀerence between the networks generated by
the Watts-Strogatz model when p = 0.1 and p = 1.0.
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3.2.4 The Fixed Model
[Nowak and May (1992)] and [Huang et al (2004)] have undertaken numerical sim-
ulations of complex systems which are inﬂuenced by the underlying network topol-
ogy. Nowak studied the iterative prisoner's dilemma problem while Huang simu-
lated the spread of SARS in Singapore. Nowak and Huang both incorporated the
Watts-Strogatz model to produce a small world network and chose to keep the net-
work topology ﬁxed for the entire duration of the numerical simulation. Although
this is in contrast to the contracting model, this serves to inspire another version of
the Extended GR problem, where the network topology remains ﬁxed throughout
the numerical simulation. This version will be known as the ﬁxed model. The rules
for the ﬁxed model remain similar to those of the contracting model, although one
rule is diﬀerent: when a player achieves or becomes bankrupt they rejoin the net-
work immediately, restarting with their original initial resources. The player also
reconnects and plays with its original opponents. Under these circumstances, the
network topology remains ﬁxed throughout the game. Consequently, the network
size and the average strength of the network remain constant. Although this may
be true, the gain loss parameter and resource per player will not remain constant.
However, in the resource per player case Figure 34 illustrates that over the simula-
tion duration this parameter exhibits a small variation. This value is not constant
because a player can achieve with resources beyond their target and this extra re-
source is not allocated to them when they rejoin the game. However this imbalance
is addressed when the bankrupt player restarts with their original initial resource.
This means that the total resources in the network will experience a small ﬂuctu-
ation as diﬀerent players do not necessarily achieve and become bankrupt at the
same time. The resource per player parameter will not be discussed any further
in this section.
Figure 35 illustrates the gain loss parameter for the Watts-Strogatz model pure
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Figure 34: The inﬂuence of the ﬁxed model on the normalised Resource/Player
parameter throughout the game. Network topology is a pure ring, 100 players
with 10 neighbours (opponents) each, initial resource of 110 and a target of 200.
Results averaged over 50 histories.
ring (p = 0.0), small world (p = 0.1) and random (p = 1.0) networks respectively.
In contrast to the contracting model (Figures 28 and 32), the ﬁxed model gain loss
parameter oscillates without the damping eﬀects. Nevertheless for the ﬁxed model,
there appears to be little diﬀerence between the results for the three diﬀerent
network topologies generated by the Watts-Strogatz model. The Watts-Strogatz
network for the ﬁxed model produced similar results. On the other hand other
network topologies such as those generated by Erd®s-Rényi and Barabási-Albert
may generate a diﬀerent result. Table 5 describes the cases considered where all
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network topology sizes are ﬁxed to 100 players. The inﬂuence of diﬀerent network
sizes will be discussed in Chapter 5. We wish to consider the value of the gain
Case Network description
ER 0.25 Erd®s-Rényi model of a random network
probability of connection = 0.25
ER 0.5 Erd®s-Rényi model of a random network
probability of connection = 0.5
ER 0.75 Erd®s-Rényi model of a random network
probability of connection = 0.75
WS 0.0 Watts-Strogatz model
probability of rewiring = 0.0
WS 0.1 Watts-Strogatz model
probability of rewiring = 0.1
WS 1.0 Watts-Strogatz model
probability of rewiring = 1.0
BA Barabási-Albert model
scale free network
Table 5: The list of network topologies to be investigated in order to determine
their inﬂuence on the ﬁxed model. All networks are ﬁxed to 100 players, initial
resource of 110 and a target of 200.
loss parameter after 10,000 rounds. Figure 36 shows for that there is a notice-
able diﬀerence between results produced by the Erd®s-Rényi and Barabási-Albert
models and those produced by the Watts-Strogatz model. This is especially true
for the network generated by the Erd®s-Rényi model with a probability of con-
nection p = 0.75. This suggests that the network topology may have an inﬂuence
on the game. To understand the results shown in Figure 36 further, we explore
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the achieving player's exiting degree of each of the network topologies considered
in Table 5. This is because, given that each case considered in Table 5 has every
player with the same initial resource and target, then there must be another factor
that results in more achievements in one type of network topology as opposed to
another. Figure 37 illustrates the achieving player's exit degree for each of the
network topologies considered in Table 5. In most cases, a network topology that
exhibits a gain loss parameter also has a high exit degree for its achieving players.
This theme will be investigate further in Chapter 5, with diﬀerent network sizes
also taken into consideration.
In conclusion to this chapter, [Rocha and Stern (2004)] extended the classical
GR problem from a two player to a N -player game. They derived a result linking
the number of players and initial resource to the ﬁrst expected time of bankruptcy.
However, they assume a fully connected network and their analytical results are
only valid under simplifying conditions, i.e. for an initial resource whose value
approximates the number of players, an equal initial resource and an inﬁnite target.
Unlike previous models, the version of the GR problem presented in this thesis goes
beyond the ﬁrst expected time of bankruptcy. As a result, new parameters such as
MTTB (mean time to bankruptcy) and MTTA (mean time to achievement) have
been introduced in this thesis. In addition to this, two variations of the Extended
GR problem were introduced: the contracting and ﬁxed models. The contracting
model had the property of always evolving into a two player GR problem while
the ﬁxed model indicated the importance of the achievers player's exiting degree
in inﬂuencing the game.
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Figure 35: The inﬂuence of the network topology generated by the Watts-Strogatz
model with p = 0.0, 0.1 and 1.0 on the gain loss parameter (GainLoss) throughout
the game for the ﬁxed model. Initial network size 100, initial resources of 110 and
a target of 200. Results averaged over 50 histories.
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Figure 36: The inﬂuence of diﬀerent network topologies (Table 5) on the gain
loss (GainLoss) parameter after 10000 round for the ﬁxed model. Initial network
size 100, initial resources of 110, a target of 200. Results were averaged over 50
histories.
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Figure 37: The inﬂuence of diﬀerent network topologies (Table 5) on the achieving
player's exit degree k for the ﬁxed model. Initial network size 100, initial resources
of 110, a target of 200. Results were averaged over 50 histories.
4 THE EVOLVING NETWORK MODEL 65
4 The Evolving Network Model
In this chapter we introduce another variation of the Extended GR problem, in
which the network topology evolves more generally as the game is played as op-
posed to remaining ﬁxed or contracting as in the previous cases.
4.1 Oﬀspring and the Fish-Plankton Model
In the real world of competition, a successful business or social enterprise may
deliver what can be thought of as oﬀspring (see section 2.2.2). For example,
a successful fast food company will create franchises of its brand and locate the
new restaurants around the world [Kalnins and Lafontaine (1960)]. Likewise, a
successful church with a large congregation may plant new churches in diﬀerent
communities even if a rival church is there already [Hayward (1999)].
In order to investigate competitive behaviour and oﬀspring further, the Fish-
Plankton model [Klopfer (2008)] will now be considered.
The Fish-Plankton model is played over a three-dimensional lattice and is a
variation of the predator-prey model [Kot (2001)]. Initially each individual en-
tity, whether ﬁsh or plankton, is placed randomly within the three-dimensional
lattice, and then each ﬁsh move, eats plankton, reproduces and dies. On the other
hand, the plankton move around more slowly and reproduce. The Fish-Plankton
evolutionary rules for the ﬁsh are as follows:
F1. Allocate to each ﬁsh an initial and a target energy ﬁgure.
F2. At each time step, the ﬁsh moves into an adjacent cell which has been ran-
domly chosen. The ﬁsh loses a small amount of energy.
F3. Plankton that occupy the same cell as a ﬁsh will be eaten. Subsequently, the
ﬁsh will gain a large amount of energy.
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F4. A ﬁsh that loses all of its energy dies.
F5. A ﬁsh that has reached a target energy ﬁgure produces an oﬀspring. In the
next round, both the parent and the oﬀspring's energy ﬁgures are set to the
initial value.
The Fish-Plankton evolutionary rules for the plankton are as follows:
P1. At each time step, the plankton moves into an adjacent cell which has been
randomly chosen.
P2. The plankton produces oﬀspring after a certain number of time steps.
The Fish-Plankton model shares a similarity with the contracting version of the
Extended GR problem. Notably in both models, if a player fails they are eliminated
from the simulation, for example, when a ﬁsh dies or a player becomes bankrupt.
In contrast, however, in the Fish-Plankton model, a ﬁsh is rewarded for success
(reaching a target energy ﬁgure) by having an oﬀspring. In our contracting model
a player who achieves their target simply leaves the network. We now enhance our
model to incorporate the possibility of successful players producing oﬀspring.
4.2 Oﬀspring within the Gambler's Ruin Problem
As discussed in the previous section, there are examples from the real world of
competition as well as theoretical models where successful players are rewarded
with oﬀspring. To incorporate oﬀspring, the model rules were adapted in the
following manner:
1. When a player achieves or exceeds their target, they leave the network.
2. The total resource (those gained plus the initial resource) is divided equally
between the achiever's oﬀspring.
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3. Any resources remaining are randomly given to one of the oﬀspring.
4. All oﬀspring connect to the existing players in the network and play with
the same target as their achieving parent.
5. The oﬀspring inherit the same strength as their achieving parent.
In order to investigate the properties of the evolving model, a comparison with
the contracting version of the Extended GR problem was used. As was previously
stated in Chapter 3, the contracting model converges to the classical GR problem.
However, the evolving model introduces oﬀspring whenever a player achieves. To
understand the inﬂuence of oﬀspring, we consider four diﬀerent cases which are
detailed in Table 6. Here the attachment rule and number of neighbours are varied.
The number of oﬀspring per achiever and their degree will be explored in Chapter
5.
Case Attachment Neighbours k Oﬀspring per Achiever Oﬀspring k
case a random 2 3 3
case b random 10 3 3
case c degree dependent 2 3 3
case d degree dependent 10 3 3
Table 6: Details of the cases investigated by varying the attachment rules and
neighbours k.
The ﬁnal population Nf is deﬁned as the size of the network after 10,000
rounds. Figure 38 illustrates the inﬂuence on the ﬁnal population when the numer-
ical simulation receives a variation in the initial size of the network, the attachment
rule and the number of neighbours. Overall, the ﬁnal population increases with
the size of the initial network; the attachment rule and number of neighbours
do not have a dominant inﬂuence on this parameter. Consequently, unlike the
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Figure 38: The inﬂuence of the attachment rule, number of neighbours and initial
size of network N on the ﬁnal population Nf . For cases see Table 6. The initial
resource is the initial network size plus 10. The target is double the initial size.
Results averaged over 50 histories.
contracting version, the evolving model does not converge to the classical GR
problem in all situations. Moreover, the evolving model's network topology does
not necessarily decay into a two player game. To illustrate this, Figures 39 to 41
demonstrate an initial network size of 100 players growing to 130 after 500 rounds
and then 146 after 9500 rounds. However, it is possible for the network to be-
come segmented; for example, three players could separate from the remainder
of the population. Nonetheless, over time this could be resolved in one of two
ways. Firstly, oﬀspring or recently isolated players may connect to both parts of
the network, hence forming a bridge. Alternatively, one of the players reconnects
to the main body when their opponents achieve or become bankrupt. In contrast,
unlike Southwell's model this evolving model exhibits no numerical evidence of
self-replication (section 2.2.2).
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Figure 39: The initial evolving model's network topology at the ﬁrst round. This
is a 10 by 10 lattice network.
As discussed previously, the evolving model's network size may increase from its
initial conﬁguration. Figure 42 demonstrates the numerical growth of the network
throughout the simulation. In each case, the population is normalised by dividing
it by its original value for round 1. Table 7 depicts the various scenarios to be
simulated. In all cases, the network size grows to a steady state, where the degree
dependent attachment rule leads to a higher value than its random counterpart. A
possible explanation is that an achieving player possesses a higher exiting degree
when the attachment rule is degree dependent. Furthermore, for this attachment
rule, a player achieves more rapidly which in turns causes more oﬀspring to be
introduced into the network than in its random counterpart. Also to be noted,
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Figure 40: The evolving model's network topology after 500 rounds. The player's
attributes are an initial resource of 110 and a target of 200.
the network size reaches a steady state between 2,000 and 4,000 rounds but the
results quoted in this thesis are for 10,000 rounds, which suggests the solution is
robust (see appendix A).
Figure 43 provides numerical evidence that players do achieve more quickly
in networks with degree dependent attachment rules. Indeed the MTTA is lower
in the degree dependent attachment cases than in its random counterpart. In
addition, Figure 43 shows a similar result for the MTTB. Nevertheless, the evolv-
ing model's results compared to the contracting model's (Figure 25) reveal the
following facts:
1. The MTTB for players in the evolving model is lower than in the contracting
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Figure 41: The evolving model's network topology after 9500 rounds. The player's
attributes are an initial resource of 110 and a target of 200.
model.
2. The MTTA for players in the evolving model is higher than in the contracting
model.
It must be noted that most of the achieving players in the evolving model are
oﬀspring. Hence, those achieving players possess a lower initial resource than those
in the contracting model. As a result they have a shorter distance to bankruptcy
but a greater distance to achievement.
As well as this, the exit degree is higher with degree dependent attachment rules
than with the random equivalent. Figures 44 provides numerical evidence of this
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Cases Initial network size N Neighbours k Oﬀspring per Achiever Oﬀspring k
Case 1 50 2 3 3
Case 2 50 10 3 3
Case 3 100 2 3 3
Case 4 100 10 3 3
Case 5 150 2 3 3
Case 6 150 10 3 3
Case 7 200 2 3 3
Case 8 200 10 3 3
Table 7: Details of cases investigated by varying the initial size of network N and
neighbours k.
Figure 42: The inﬂuence of the random attachment rule (left diagram) and de-
gree dependent attachment rule (right diagram), number of neighbours and initial
network size N on the normalised population (size of network) Nr through time.
The Nr value of 1.0 equates to the initial population size. A full description of the
cases is shown in Table 7. The initial resource is the numerical initial network size
plus 10. The target is double the numerical initial network size. Results averaged
over 50 histories.
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Figure 43: The inﬂuence of attachment rule, number of neighbours and initial size
of network N on the MTTB (left diagram) and MTTA (right diagram). For cases
see Table 6. The initial resource is the initial network size plus 10. The target is
double the initial size. Results averaged over 50 histories.
statement where the ﬁgures show the achieving and bankrupt players' exit degrees
respectively. Cases a and b have random attachment rules while cases c
and d are degree dependent (see Table 6). It is worth mentioning both results
show insensitivity to the initial size of the network. Indeed on this point, the
evolving model is consistent with the contracting model (Figure 26). Conversely,
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Figure 44: The inﬂuence of attachment rule, number of neighbours and initial
size of network N on the achiever's (left diagram) and bankrupt player's (right
diagram) exit degree Exit k. For cases see Table 6. The initial resource is the
initial network size plus 10. The target is double the initial size. Results averaged
over 50 histories.
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the evolving model's exiting degree results contrast with the contracting model's
as the latter is more a reﬂection of the initial network structure while the former
represents the evolving network topology.
A global network parameter discussed for the contracting model was the aver-
age strength of the players in the network. As previously stated in section 3.2.2,
Figures 27 and 31 showed that for the contracting model the average strength
tended to approximately 0.5. In contrast, for this evolving model Figure 45 demon-
strates in all cases an average strength that tends to 1. Figure 45 (left and right
diagram) shows little diﬀerence between random and degree dependent attachment
rules. Another global network parameter discussed for the contracting model was
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Figure 45: The inﬂuence of the random attachment rule (left diagram) and de-
gree dependent attachment rule (right diagram), number of neighbours and initial
network size on the average strength. A full description of the cases is shown in Ta-
ble 7. The initial resource is the numerical initial network size plus 10. The target
is double the numerical initial network size. Results averaged over 50 histories.
the gain loss performance indicator. As previously stated in section 3.2.2, Fig-
ures 28 and 32 showed that for the contracting model in all cases the gain loss
parameter is approximately neutral. However, for the evolving model, Figure 46
(especially the random attachment rule) show that in most cases the gain loss
parameter has a value which is negative. These results will be discussed in sec-
4 THE EVOLVING NETWORK MODEL 75
tion 5.1.1. The ﬁnal global network parameter discussed for the contracting model
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Figure 46: The inﬂuence of the random attachment rule (left diagram) and degree
dependent attachment rule (right diagram), number of neighbours and initial net-
work size on the gain loss parameter GainLoss. A full description of the cases is
shown in Table 7. The initial resource is the numerical initial network size plus
10. The target is double the numerical initial network size. Results averaged over
50 histories.
was the player per resource. The evolving model's results, in comparison to the
contracting model's, is consistently below the normalised value of 1. Figure 47
demonstrates the numerical evidence of this statement in comparison to Figures 29
and 33. This is a consequence of the evolving model introducing more players (oﬀ-
spring) who are competing for the same quantity of resources. Table 8 compares
some key statistics between the evolving and contracting models. By way of ex-
ample, the simulation scenario illustrated is a lattice network with initially 100
players. In agreement with the previous arguments, the evolving model exhibits
less parity between the number of achievers and bankrupts, a higher mean time to
achievement and a lower mean time to bankruptcy than its contracting alternative.
As a consequence, the evolving model presented a gain loss parameter value that
was mostly negative (Figure 46).
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Figure 47: The inﬂuence of the random attachment rule (left diagram) and degree
dependent attachment rule (right diagram) on the normalised resource per player
parameter throughout the game. The normalised resource per player is calculated
from its respected value for a round, divided by the initial ﬁgure for round 1. A full
description of the cases is shown in Table 7. The initial resource is the numerical
initial network size plus 10. The target is double the numerical initial network
size. Results averaged over 50 histories.
Model Oﬀspring Initial Target Achievers Bankrupts MTTA MTTB
Resource
Contracting 0 110 200 53.88 44.56 592.50 761.16
Evolving 3 66 to 110 200 656.70 1267.52 911.16 585.12
Table 8: Comparing the contracting and evolving model key statistics. Initial
network topology lattice with 10,000 rounds. Results averaged over 50 histories.
In conclusion, this chapter reiterated the limitations of the contracting model
version of the Extended GR problem, as outlined in section 3.2.1. The model
penalized failure but did not reward success. To explore this further, the Fish-
Plankton model, which is a variation of the classical predator-prey model, was
considered played over a three-dimensional lattice. Here, the evolutionary rule pe-
nalized failure (the ﬁsh died) and rewarded success (the ﬁsh produced oﬀspring).
Incorporating this, another version of the Extended GR problem played over net-
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works was produced: the evolving model. In comparison to the non-oﬀspring
contracting version, this evolving model will not always evolve to the classical GR
problem.
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5 Bespoke Preferential Attachment Rules
In this chapter we will discuss and develop a bespoke preferential attachment
rule for the Extended GR problem. Although the more established degree de-
pendent preferential attachment rules are better understood, [Borgs et al (2007)]
argue that, when compared to real networks, determining the popularity of nodes
only by their degree is not realistic and other factors should be taken into con-
sideration. [Leskovec and Faloutsos (2007)] developed a bespoke preferential at-
tachment rule with the objective of networks evolving into a desired topology.
However, their rule does not take account of the player's state. On the other hand,
[Dorogovtsev et al (2000)], [Fan and Chen (2004)] and [Gong and van Leeuwen (2003)]
developed bespoke preferential attachment rules to investigate how players' prop-
erties can inﬂuence the way the network topology evolves.
This thesis considers a bespoke preferential attachment rule that we term `ku-
dos' which is inﬂuenced by the individual player's state. The ﬁrst step is to explore
the general objectives of a bespoke preferential attachment rule. Following this, the
chapter documents the motivation and inﬂuences for using the kudos preferential
attachment rule. We shall then investigate how the kudos preferential attach-
ment rule inﬂuences the Extended GR problem and look for any new dynamical
behaviour that arises.
5.1 Examples of Bespoke Preferential Attachment Rules
As we already discussed in section 1.1.3, [Berger et al (2004)] questioned whether
the Barabási-Albert model's linear preferential attachment rule is the single under-
lying mechanism that leads to a scale free network. Moreover, [Fan and Chen (2004)],
[Gong and van Leeuwen (2003)] and [Yan et al (2004)] concentrated on other vari-
ations of the Barabási-Albert model's linear preferential attachment rule to see if
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they led to scale free networks. In these cases, the authors developed bespoke
preferential attachment rules where the network evolves into a desired topology: a
scale free network with a high clustering coeﬃcient. [Boccaletti et al (2006)] also
summarize a number of preferential attachment techniques which generate scale
free networks with a high clustering coeﬃcient. These are more representative of
real world networks. However, in this thesis the objective is not to replicate a real
world network.
Instead, we consider how players' properties interact and inﬂuence the evolv-
ing network topology. For example, [Krapivsky et al (2000)] developed a prefer-
ential attachment rule based on the age of the player. Using this variation of
linear preferential attachment, Krapivsky argued that an evolving scale free net-
work could be generated with any power law value λ greater than 2. Similarly,
[Lehmann et al (2005)] considered how scientiﬁc papers are cited over the years
and represented it as an evolving network. They argued that preferential attach-
ment must be supplemented by appropriate additional ingredients. For example,
whether a new paper attaches to an existing one depends not only on the number
of citations it has, but also on other associated unique factors. For instance, all
papers are considered in Lehmann et al's model as live or dead. At each time step
the probability of a live paper dying is inversely proportional to the number of ci-
tations that it has received. In addition to this, a new paper does not attach to an
existing one which is regarded as dead. In short, bespoke preferential attachment
rules consider attractiveness rather than the player's degree.
5.1.1 Preferential Attachment Based on Attractiveness
There are a number of examples of bespoke preferential attachment rules based on
attractiveness. For example, [Jensen (2008)] developed an evolving network model
inspired by biological reproduction dynamics. At each time step a player has one
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oﬀspring while another is removed from the network. Jensen deﬁnes attractiveness
as being connected to one's parent and their friends. For example, oﬀspring asso-
ciate with their parents' friends more than a complete stranger. The oﬀspring in
Jensen's paper attach to the players who are already connected to their parents.
Jensen also explores the alternative approach of giving preference to those who
are not attached to one's parent. The initial size of the network is N , and the
evolutionary rules are as follows. At each time step:
1. A player is chosen at random and removed. All associated edges are removed.
2. Another player is chosen at random from the remaining N−1 nodes and has
one oﬀspring.
3. The oﬀspring is connecting to its parent with probability pp.
4. Each player connected to the parent is connected to the oﬀspring with prob-
ability pe.
5. Each player that is not connected to the parent is connected to the oﬀspring
with probability pn.
Jensen's approach diﬀers from the evolving model for the Extended GR problem.
Firstly, Jensen's network size remains ﬁxed; at each time step one player dies and
one oﬀspring is introduced. Secondly, in Jensen's model, the network topology
changes at each time step. Thirdly, in Jensen's model, the parent remains in
the network and has only one oﬀspring. In contrast, it was decided that for our
evolving model the successful player would leave the network and might produce
many oﬀspring. This is because we wanted to mimic the competitive behaviour
of a successful family business where the owners retire and the business is divided
between the owner's oﬀspring. Finally, in Jensen's model which players succeed
or fail is chosen at random, it is not based on their performance. In summary,
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Jensen's model utilizes the network structure for its attachment rule as opposed
to a unique state of the player. Moreover, it illustrates that at a low value of pn
the network tends to fragment. As we saw in section 4.2, the evolving model can
also illustrate networks that fragment.
[Britton and Lindholm (2009)] developed another evolving network with its
own bespoke attachment rule, also inspired by biological reproduction dynam-
ics. Here, Britton et al consider a network that evolves through continuous time
where oﬀspring are born and old players die. Furthermore, each player is assigned
a diﬀerent social index number which is randomly selected. The oﬀspring in Brit-
ton's model attach proportionally to those players with the highest social index.
If Sj is the social index number of player j then the probability of an oﬀspring
connecting to player j is:
Sj
N(t)∑
k=1
Sk
. (5.1.1)
where N (t) is the size of the network at time t. We note that the preferential
attachment rule is based on the player's social index number not their degree.
However, Britton's model diﬀers from Jensen's as the network size does not remain
ﬁxed. For instance, if Britton's model assumes an average birth rate of λ and a
death rate of µ then the network size may decay to zero or grow at an exponential
rate:
N (t) ∝ et(λ−µ). (5.1.2)
Furthermore, Britton's approach diﬀers from Lehmann's as Britton's preferential
attachment rule is independent of the player's degree. However for Britton's model,
the network topology does not inﬂuence the player's social index number and the
oﬀspring are not associated with their parents. Nonetheless, Britton's approach
only considers a player's state when it inﬂuences the network topology; it does
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not consider an evolving network topology that inﬂuences the player's state as in
Lehmann's model.
In contrast, [Ren et al (2008)] and [Gómez-Gardeñes et al (2008)] both devel-
oped models that consider the interplay between the player's state and the evolv-
ing network topology. In both cases, these models played the iterative prisoner's
dilemma over networks. In the two models the attachment rule is inﬂuenced by
the player's payoﬀ. Ren's uses the following preferential attachment probability:
Mi +W∑
j
(Mj +W)
. (5.1.3)
whereMi is the total payoﬀ of player i andW is a tunable parameter. AsW tends
to inﬁnity the less inﬂuence the player's total payoﬀ has on their attractiveness.
Gómez-Gardeñes, alternatively, employs the following expression for preferential
attachment probability:
1− ε+ εfi (t)
N(t)∑
j=1
1− ε+ εfj (t)
. (5.1.4)
where fi (t) is the total payoﬀ for player i and ε is a tunable parameter ranging
from 0 to 1. As ε tends to zero the less inﬂuence the player's total payoﬀ has on
their attractiveness.
[Poncela and Vespignani (2009)] also considered an iterative prisoner's dilemma
played over evolving networks similar to that of Gómez-Gardeñes. However in this
case, Poncela et al employed the preferential attachment probability:
eεfi(t)
N∑
j=1
eεfj(t)
. (5.1.5)
Poncela demonstrated that the choice of ε has an inﬂuence on how the network
topology evolves which in turn aﬀects the payoﬀ of each player. Figure 48 shows
the results of the numerical simulation in Poncela et al's paper.
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Figure 48: Evolving network topology in Poncela et al's model with (a) ε = 0
(b) ε = 0.1 (c) ε = 1.0; ﬁgures on the left show the degree distribution for a
network of size 1000; ﬁgures on the right show a snapshot of a network of size 100
[Poncela and Vespignani (2009)].
As can be seen from Figure 48, Poncela et al show that as ε tends to 1, the
network topology evolves towards a giant component. This is similar to the giant
component discussed by [Erd®s and Rényi (1959)] in their random network model
in section 1.1.1. This is an important theme in this thesis and is discuss further
in section 5.3.2.
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5.2 Preferential Attachment Rule for the Extended Gam-
bler's Ruin Problem
In Poncela et al's model, the player with the highest payoﬀ possesses the greatest
kudos in the network. In this case, kudos is deﬁned as the player's honour, repu-
tation, glory, acclaim and prestige. However for the evolving model, the player's
kudos is not easily represented by its current properties: degree, target, strength
and initial and current resources. The player's strength, for instance, becomes ho-
mogeneous throughout the network as its topology evolves (see Figure 45). Hence
it does not provide a notable advantage. Moreover, the player's current resource,
whether high or low, may suggest that their departure from the network is im-
minent; therefore no beneﬁt is oﬀered to the oﬀspring attaching to it. However,
to represent kudos it is necessary to include an additional player's property. This
will be further explained in the next section.
5.3 The Kudos Preferential Attachment Rule
In this section we will introduce, deﬁne and explore the properties of the ku-
dos preferential attachment rule by comparing and contrasting it with the more
established methodologies: random and degree dependent. As well as this, an
examination of how the kudos preferential attachment rule inﬂuences this version
of the Extended GR problem.
The kudos preferential attachment rule is deﬁned as follows:
• At the beginning of the game, a player is chosen at random and is given a
golden unit. This player is regarded as the current title holder.
• At each round, the title holder gives the golden unit to its highest scoring
neighbour, provided that neighbour scores higher than the title holder. In
5 BESPOKE PREFERENTIAL ATTACHMENT RULES 85
these circumstances, the highest scoring neighbour has now become the new
title holder.
• Otherwise in a round, the title holder keeps the golden unit and remains
the title holder.
• Under the circumstances that the title holder achieves and leaves the net-
work, the new title holder will be the network's highest scoring player for
that round.
The title holder can never become bankrupt as they must have beaten at
least one other player to gain or to keep hold of the golden unit. However, a
title holder can become isolated if all their opponents leave the network in the
same round. We will deﬁne a kudos player as a player that is still in the game
and has held or is holding the golden unit. As well as this, we will deﬁne the
kudos population as the total number of kudos players.
An oﬀspring or an isolated player (including the title holder) preferentially
attaches to an opponent with probability:
Kj
N(t)∑
n=1
Kn
. (5.3.1)
where Kj is the number of rounds player j has held the golden unit, whereas
N(t) is the size of the network at time t. The denominator of the above expression
can never be equal to zero as there is alway at least one kudos player in every
round. It must be noted that the probability of attachment to a certain player
varies throughout the duration of the game due to:
1. The rate at which a player obtains kudos in comparison to the rest of the
network.
2. The growth or decay of the kudos population through time.
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Before we investigate the inﬂuence of kudos on the network topology, we will
consider its inﬂuence on the player's state itself. To illustrate this further, some
snapshot results from the evolving model for three individual players (player 101,
player 102 and player 103) can be taken into consideration. For this example the
initial resource is 100, the target is 200, initial network size 100, initial network
topology is a lattice with periodic boundary conditions. Players 101, 102 and 103
are the ﬁrst oﬀspring to enter the game and all have the same parent. Therefore
Player 101's initial resource is 67, while the other oﬀspring is 66. In Figure 49,
the eﬀect on degree and resources before and after each player has obtained ku-
dos is considered. Each player enters the game at approximately the 80th round.
Furthermore, player 102 obtains kudos by winning the golden unit at approx-
imately the 350th round. This is illustrated in the upper diagram of Figure 49.
With this in mind, before the 350th round, each player's degree remains less than
5 and their resource steadily declines from its initial value. Subsequently after the
350th round, the degree and resources of player 102 increase rapidly, achieving the
target at the 420th round. In addition to this, the same behaviour for player 101
and 103 is observed, obtaining kudos at the 450th and 500th rounds respectively as
well as achieving the target at the 500th and 520th rounds respectively. Hence from
Figure 49, it is observed that when a player obtains kudos, there is an increase in
the degree as well as the resources which facilitate the objectives of achieving the
target.
5 BESPOKE PREFERENTIAL ATTACHMENT RULES 87
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
Round0
1
2
3
4
5
kudos
Player 103
Player 102
Player 101
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
Round0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
k
Player 103
Player 102
Player 101
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
Round0
50
100
150
200
Resources
Player 103
Player 102
Player 101
Figure 49: The kudos value (upper diagram), degree (middle diagram) and re-
source (lower diagram) of individual players throughout the duration of the game.
Snapshots result from the evolving model. Initial resource: 100, target: 200, ini-
tial network size: 100, initial network topology: lattice with periodic boundary
conditions.
In Figure 50 we show a comparison between the kudos, random and degree de-
pendent preferential attachment rules. Here the exiting degree, MTTA and MTTB
are considered. With reference to Figure 50 upper diagram, the kudos preferential
attachment rule presents a larger achiever's exiting degree than its random and
degree dependent counterparts. Furthermore, with reference to Figure 50 lower
diagram, the kudos preferential attachment rule generates a MTTA value which
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is less than the MTTB; this is not true for the more established attachment rules.
In addition to this speciﬁc case, the kudos preferential attachment rule's MTTA
exhibits a value which is at least seven times smaller than its random and degree
dependent counterparts while MTTB it is at least twice as small. As a result,
the players achieve quicker in the evolving model when kudos is the preferential
attachment rule than players become bankrupt. This is a surprising result as the
other attachment rules do not show this property.
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Figure 50: Comparison of preferential attachment rule's inﬂuence on achiever's
exiting degree k (upper diagram), MTTA and MTTB (lower diagram). Initial pe-
riodic boundary condition lattice network, 10 by 10, 10,000 rounds, initial resource
of 100 and a target of 200. Results averaged over 50 histories.
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5.3.1 Comparison with the Other Preferential Attachment Rules
For this section we will discuss each attachment rule's inﬂuence on general network
topology and players' performance parameters. Firstly this section will document
the inﬂuence of the preferential attachment rule on the ﬁnal population; this is
illustrated in Figure 51. Table 9 is a list of cases that were addressed. The
benchmark experiments undertaken by [Rocha and Stern (2004)] and discussed in
section 4.2 are repeated.
Case Attachment Neighbours k Oﬀspring per Achiever Oﬀspring k
case a random 2 3 3
case b random 10 3 3
case c degree dependent 2 3 3
case d degree dependent 10 3 3
case e kudos 2 3 3
case f kudos 10 3 3
Table 9: Details of cases to be investigated by varying the attachment rules and
neighbours k. Similar to Table 6 but with the kudos preferential attachment rule
added.
In section 4.2 we investigated the inﬂuence of random and degree dependent at-
tachment rules on normalised population, gain loss, average strength and resource
per player when we varied the initial size of the network and number of neigh-
bours of each player. Repeating the exercise this time for our kudos preferential
attachment rule we found that in contrast to the established approaches, the kudos
preferential attachment rule (case e and case f ) produces a larger population size
in the network after 10,000 rounds which steadily increases with initial population
size. However in agreement with section 4.2, the number of neighbours does not
greatly inﬂuence the size of the population. This is illustrated in Figure 52 where
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Figure 51: The ﬁnal population size Nf in each of the cases of Table 9 after 10,000
rounds. Results averaged over 50 histories.
there is little variation between the cases. In comparison to Figure 42 left and
Figure 52: The inﬂuence of the kudos preferential attachment rule, number of
neighbours and initial network size N on the normalised population (size of net-
work) Nr through time. The Nr value of 1.0 equates to the initial population
size. A full description of cases is shown in Table 7. The initial resource is the
numerical initial network size plus 10. The target is double the numerical initial
network size. Results averaged over 50 histories.
right diagram, which are random attachment and degree dependent rules respec-
tively, the kudos preferential attachment rule converges to a higher normalised
population in all cases. It is also noted that, for this approach, there is less in vari-
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ation between the cases than for the established attachment rules. With this in
mind, the experiments illustrated in Figure 43 left and right diagrams, the MTTB
and MTTA respectively, are also repeated and are shown in Figure 53. The case
scenarios described in Table 9 are used. It is noted that the kudos preferential
attachment rule signiﬁcantly decreases the value of both MTTA and MTTB in
comparison to the established approaches. The eﬀect of the kudos preferential
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Figure 53: The inﬂuence of the preferential attachment rule, number of neighbours
and initial network size N on MTTA (left diagram) and MTTB (right diagram).
The initial resource is 10 more than the numerical initial network size and the
target is double the numerical initial network size. A full case description is shown
in Table 9. Results averaged over 50 histories.
attachment rule methodology upon the achiever and bankrupt exit degree shown
in Figure 54. For kudos preferential attachment, the achiever exit degree is clearly
heavily inﬂuenced by the initial size of the network much more so than in the case
of the established attachment rules. We discuss this further in section 5.3.2. In
contrast, the bankrupt exit degree exhibits no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the
three preferential attachment rules. This result is surprising as it suggest that ku-
dos inﬂuences players who achieve but not those who become bankrupt. Repeating
the benchmark simulations illustrated in Figure 45, the inﬂuence of the kudos pref-
erential attachment rule on the average player's strength is analysed (see Table 7
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Figure 54: The inﬂuence of the preferential attachment rules, number of neighbours
and initial network size N on the achiever's (left diagram) and bankrupt's (right
diagram) exit degree Exit k. The initial resource is 10 more than the numerical
initial network size and the target is double the numerical initial network size. A
full case description is shown in Table 9. Results averaged over 50 histories.
for case description). Comparing Figure 55 and those previously mentioned, there
is little diﬀerence between all three preferential attachment rules. This is to be
expected as, over the duration of the game, we would expect the descendants of
the strongest players to remain in the network. In section 4.2 for the gain loss
parameter, the evolving model performance was inferior to the contracting net-
work version (Figures 33 and 46). In other words, the evolving network model's
oﬀspring that become bankrupt had an adverse eﬀect on the gain loss parameter.
However, as illustrated in Figure 56, the kudos preferential attachment rule trans-
poses this result. This is again surprising, as it shows kudos changing some but
not all aspects of the evolving network topology. It suggests that with kudos more
players with some distance to the target are achieving than with any other estab-
lished attachment rules. Finally, repeating the benchmark simulation experiments
illustrated in Figure 47, the normalised resource per player ratio is considered.
From the results illustrated in Figure 57 there is some diﬀerence between kudos
and the other preferential attachment rules. For kudos, the normalised resource
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Figure 55: The inﬂuence of the kudos preferential attachment rule, number of
neighbours and initial network size on the average strength. A full description of
cases is shown in Table 7. The initial resource is the numerical initial network size
plus 10. The target is double the numerical initial network size. Results averaged
over 50 histories.
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Figure 56: The inﬂuence of the kudos preferential attachment rule, number
of neighbours and initial network size on the gain loss performance indicator
GainLoss. A full description of cases is shown in Table 7. The initial resource
is the numerical initial network size plus 10. The target is double the numerical
initial network size. Results averaged over 50 histories.
per player ratio is approximately a third lower than that for random and degree
dependent preferential attachment. This is not surprising because, as shown in
Figure 52, for kudos there are more players in the game.
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Figure 57: The inﬂuence of the kudos preferential attachment rule, number of
neighbours and initial network size on the normalised resource per player parame-
ter of the network throughout the duration of the game. A full description of cases
is shown in Table 7. The initial resource is the numerical initial network size plus
10. The target is double the numerical initial network size. Results averaged over
50 histories. The normalised player per resource is calculated from its respective
value for a round, divided by the initial ﬁgure for round 1.
5.3.2 Varying the Target with a Fixed Initial Resource
We have investigated how our Extended GR problem has departed from that of
[Rocha and Stern (2004)]. So far, the player's target and initial resource were
linked to the initial number of players, twice the value and an addition of ten
respectively. However, in this section we shall explore further properties of our
Extended GR problem by varying the player's target while ﬁxing the initial re-
source. To demonstrate, Figures 58 illustrates the eﬀect of preferential attachment
rules on the ﬁnal population, MTTA and MTTB respectively, when varying the
target while keeping the initial resource ﬁxed. Figures 58 show some interesting
5 BESPOKE PREFERENTIAL ATTACHMENT RULES 95
results. For instance, the established preferential attachment rules produce similar
graphs as the target is varied. However, for the bespoke preferential attachment
rule kudos, there appears to be two phases. The ﬁnal population declines steadily
as the target increases; however, there is a point at which there is a sudden re-
duction. The MTTA and MTTB initially remain constant as the target increases
until it reaches a certain point, after this it suddenly rises. Figure 58's results
robustness is considered further in appendix A (Figures 85 and 86).
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Figure 58: The inﬂuence of the target and attachment rule on ﬁnal population
Nf (upper diagram), MTTA (middle diagram) and MTTB (lower diagram). The
initial resource is ﬁxed at 100 units; the initial network size is 100 players; 10,000
rounds. Results averaged over 50 histories.
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It appears that the kudos preferential attachment rule introduces a phase tran-
sition into the numerical simulation results of the Extended GR problem. In
section 5.3.3, we shall discuss the possible scaling laws of this phase transition.
However, we now continue to explore the properties of the evolving model by
varying the player's target while ﬁxing the initial resource.
As was seen in Figure 50 (lower diagram), a fundamental diﬀerence between
kudos and the other attachment rules was that the MTTA is less than the MTTB.
This property may give an indication why the result produced by the kudos prefer-
ential attachment rule is diﬀerent. As a consequence, we shall investigate the ratio
between the MTTA and MTTB further. Figure 59 illustrates the inﬂuence of the
target and attachment rule on the ratio MTTA
MTTB
and exit degree k. From Figure 59
it is observed that there is more numerical evidence of a phase transition. Indeed,
the established preferential attachment rules produce results that are fairly con-
stant as the target increases. However in Figure 59 (upper diagram), for the kudos
preferential attachment rule, MTTA
MTTB
remains constant before a distinctive rise as
the target increases. In Figure 59 (lower diagram) k exhibits a linear decline for
the ﬁrst phase, followed by a constant steady value. So far this we have only
considered one particular initial network size of 100 players. To understand our
results further we shall now vary not only the target but also the initial network
sizes, as well as the number of oﬀspring. Figure 60 illustrates the inﬂuence these
factors have on the ratio of the MTTA and MTTB and on the player's exiting
degree. Also the factors' inﬂuence on the ﬁnal population is shown in Figure 61.
Figures 60 and 61 show more numerical evidence of a phase transition; however,
the critical point no longer remains in the same position but is inﬂuenced by the
target, initial network size and number of oﬀspring. It must be noted that from
Figure 60 lower diagram, the player's exit degree increases rapidly as the target
decreases from the critical point.
5 BESPOKE PREFERENTIAL ATTACHMENT RULES 97
ææ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
àà à àà
à
à
ààà ìì ì ìì
ì
ì
ììì
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
Target0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
MTTA
MTTB
ì Degree
à Random
æ Kudos
æ
æ
æ
ææ æ æ
æ
æ
àà à àà à àààà ìì ì ìì ì ìììì
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
Target0
50
100
150
200
k
ì Degree
à Random
æ Kudos
Figure 59: The inﬂuence of the target and attachment rule on the ratio MTTA
MTTB
(upper diagram) and exit degree k (lower diagram). The initial resource is ﬁxed at
100 units; the initial network size is 100 players; 10,000 rounds. Results averaged
over 50 histories.
We shall now attempt to give an explanation for the occurrence of the phase
transition in the kudos preferential attachment rule. From Figure 59 it is observed
that the phase transition occurs when the target is in between 250 and 260. As
well as this, the ratio MTTA
MTTB
for the target 250 is less than 1 while for 260 it
is greater than 1 (Figure 60). Therefore, the ratio MTTA
MTTB
may indicate how the
network topology has evolved. Comparing Figure 60 lower and upper diagram, a
high exiting degree corresponds to where the MTTA
MTTB
< 1. Hence, we shall deﬁne
subcritical and supercritical regions. The subcritical region is where the target
is less than the critical target and is characterised by MTTA
MTTB
< 1 in this region.
The supercritical region is where the target is greater than the critical target
and is characterised by MTTA
MTTB
> 1. As an example, results obtained from the
evolving model for both subcritical and supercritical regions (a target of 150 and
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Figure 60: Varying the target and initial network size N : eﬀect on ratio MTTA
MTTB
(upper diagram) and exit degree k (lower diagram). The initial resource is ﬁxed to
100 units; the initial network size is 100 players; 10,000 rounds. Results averaged
over 50 histories.
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Figure 61: Varying the target and oﬀspring: eﬀect on ﬁnal population Nf (lower
diagram) and MTTA (upper diagram). The initial resource is ﬁxed to 100 units;
the initial network size is 100 players; 10,000 rounds. Results averaged over 50
histories.
550 represents these regions respectively) are analysed. With this in mind the fol-
lowing variables are considered: the probability distribution of the exiting degree,
the game's frequency of achievement, the probability distribution of the kudos
population size and the probability a player will hold kudos for a given length of
time before achieving. We see from Figure 62, the probability distribution of the
exiting degree in the subcritical region, that a player can expect to be connected
to over 150 opponents when they achieve. However in the supercritical region, a
player can expect to be connected to fewer than 20 opponents. Before deﬁning the
frequency of achievement, we will deﬁne the event R to be the number of rounds
before the next player achieves once a player has achieved. For example, when
R = 10, this means that when one player achieved the next player achieved 10
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Figure 62: Probability distribution of the exiting degree k in the subcritical re-
gion (target of 150 - left diagram) and supercritical region (target of 550 - right
diagram). The initial resource is ﬁxed at 100 units; the initial network size is 100
players; 10,000 rounds. Results averaged over 50 histories.
rounds later. For each simulation we calculate the frequency of achievement
as follows: For each R = 1, 2, 3, . . . the number of times the event R occurs is
calculated and then the frequency is obtained by dividing by the total number of
times a player achieves their target. This gives a frequency distribution so that
diﬀerent scenarios (i.e. targets) can be compared.
Figure 63, representing the subcritical region (target of 150), shows the inter-
esting result that there is approximately a 40 percent chance a player will achieve
in every two or three rounds during a 10,000 round game. Moreover, in the sub-
critical region, achievement occurs less than once in every seven rounds. However
in the supercritical region (target of 550), achievement of players can occur once
in every 100 rounds, in other words, achievement occurs very infrequently. The
ﬁrst peak in the supercritical region's results represents those group of players
that achieved at approximately the same time early in the simulation. Figure 64
shows the probability that the kudos population will be of a given size when a
player achieves. The probability distributions illustrated in Figure 64 are impor-
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Figure 63: Frequency of achievement in the subcritical region (target of 150 - left
diagram) and supercritical region (target of 550 - right diagram). This is shown
as a probability distribution. The initial resource is ﬁxed at 100 units; the initial
network size is 100 players; 10,000 rounds. Results averaged over 50 histories.
tant because, for the kudos attachment rule, the oﬀspring of the achieving player
can only attach to those in the network who have kudos. In the subcritical region
(target of 150), the oﬀspring of an achieving player can only choose to attach to at
most seven players during a 10,000 round simulation. For the supercritical region
(target of 550), an oﬀspring of an achieving player can choose from over 60 players
who have held kudos. Figure 65 shows the probability a player will have kudos
for a given length of time before achieving. In the event that a player receives
the golden unit, the number of rounds it takes to achieve is important as shown
in Figure 49. In the subcritical region (target of 150), Figure 65 shows a player
can achieve within six rounds from the time they received kudos. However, for
the supercritical region (target of 550), a player may take two hundred rounds
to achieve from the time that they ﬁrst received kudos. In all cases the contrast
between the sub and supercritical regions is clear.
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Figure 64: Probability distribution of the kudos population when a player achieves
in the subcritical region (target of 150 - left diagram) and supercritical region
(target of 550 - right diagram). The initial resource is ﬁxed at 100 units; the initial
network size is 100 players; 10,000 rounds. Results averaged over 50 histories.
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Figure 65: Probability distribution of the number of rounds it takes a player to
achieve in the subcritical region (target of 150 - left diagram) and supercritical
region (target of 550 - right diagram) when they have kudos. The initial resource
is ﬁxed at 100 units; the initial network size is 100 players; 10,000 rounds. Results
averaged over 50 histories.
In the subcritical region, represented by a target of 150, an oﬀspring of an
achieving player is expected to arrive every two to three rounds and can only
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choose from seven players who have held kudos. In addition, once a player receives
kudos then they could potentially connect to up to 250 opponents (Figure 61,
target of 150 and three oﬀspring) and within six rounds achieve their target. The
consequence of this is that the kudos population size will remain small because by
the time new players have obtained kudos most of the older kudos players (those
who have kudos the longest) have already achieved.
To emphasize this point, Figures 66, 67, 68 and 69 show some network topolo-
gies for a number of successive rounds. Within these ﬁgures, the players with
kudos are represented by orange nodes. Here we see that the kudos players have
the largest degree.
 
Figure 66: First of four successive illustrative rounds (round 9981) of the evolving
model. Game played in the subcritical region (target of 150). Orange nodes are
players with kudos. Player 16214 is about to achieve.
In Figures 66, 67 and 68 we observe a repeated pattern of one round where there
is large number of isolated players which is then followed by them all connecting
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Figure 67: Second of four successive illustrative rounds (round 9982) of the evolving
model. Game played in the subcritical region (target of 150). Orange nodes are
players with kudos. When Player 16214 achieves it causes mass isolation.
to the few players who have kudos (the orange nodes). In the next round, at
least one of the players with kudos achieves causing a large number of players to
become isolated and subsequentially the pattern is repeated. However, repeating
the same exercise but in the supercritical region (target 550) shows a diﬀerent
evolution. Because the network is evolving more slowly we take a snapshot every
1000 rounds.
As can be observed from Figures 69 to 72, the networks in the supercritical
region comprise more players with kudos than their subcritical counterparts. In
other words, the older kudos players remain in the network longer. When a player
achieves, their oﬀspring (as well as isolated players) can thus choose to attach to
a larger group of potential opponents with kudos. In summary, in the subcritical
region, the few players with kudos will attain a large exiting degree because they are
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Figure 68: Third of four successive illustrative rounds (round 9983) of the evolving
model. Game played in the subcritical region (target of 150). Orange nodes are
players with kudos. Player 16351 is about to achieve.
the only opponents the oﬀspring and isolated players can preferentially attach to.
As an illustration, Figure 73 upper diagram illustrates the inﬂuence of varying the
target on the average number of isolated players per achievement event. This also
shows the number of neighbours the achiever had prior to achieving. From these
ﬁgures it is observed that in the subcritical region (target less than 260), most of the
achiever's neighbours become isolated when the player achieves. Furthermore, as
illustrated in Figure 73 lower diagram, an achieving player can exceed their target
in the subcritical region. However in the supercritical region, an achieving player
will exceed their target only by a few units. To clarify this, the achieving player's
exit degree inﬂuences how many units they will exceed the target by because when
a player has a large degree they will beat many other players. Moreover, the exit
degree increases when the target decreases in the subcritical region because there
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Figure 69: Fourth of four successive illustrative rounds (round 9984) of the evolving
model. Game played in the subcritical region (target of 150). Orange nodes are
players with kudos. When Player 16351 achieves it causes mass isolation.
is a high number of isolated players connecting to a small number of potential
opponents who have kudos (Figure 64). As a consequence, the MTTA will remain
approximately the same due to the large number of isolated players, the small
number of potential opponents who have kudos and the large exit degree causing
a gain in units in excess of the target. However in the supercritical region, the
target is larger causing many of the players to become bankrupt instead. In the
subcritical region a player can achieve without ﬁrst bankrupting their neighbours,
who then may become isolated. For a player to achieve in the supercritical region,
they ﬁrst may have to bankrupt their neighbours before reaching their targets,
hence there will be a lower number in isolation. In short, for the supercritical
region, when the target increases, the MTTA will increase also.
The kudos population size is deﬁned as the number of players still playing
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Figure 70: First of three illustrative rounds of the evolving model: round 7000.
Game played in the supercritical region (target of 550). Orange nodes are players
with kudos.
who have held the golden unit. As illustrated in Figure 64, a signiﬁcant diﬀer-
ence in this value is observed in the subcritical and supercritical regions. From
a diﬀerent perspective, Figure 74 illustrates the inﬂuence of diﬀerent targets on
the kudos population size as a proportion of the total network through time. We
observe that after 10, 000 rounds, the kudos population size has increased signif-
icantly from targets of 250 to 350. In this case, these targets are located either
side of the critical point.
To investigate the factors that limit the growth of the kudos population as well
as the phase transition we deﬁne the following;
• Original players are the players who were in the network at the start of
the game.
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Figure 71: Second of three illustrative rounds of the evolving model: round 8000.
Game played in the supercritical region (target of 550). Orange nodes are players
with kudos.
• First generation are the oﬀspring of the original players.
Furthermore, we shall consider whether it is the ﬁrst generation that inﬂuences
whether the kudos population grows or declines. The reasoning behind this is
that the ﬁrst generation can only preferentially attach to kudos players and hence
increases the kudos player's degree. If the number of the ﬁrst generation exceeds
the kudos population this may result in the degree of all kudos players increas-
ing signiﬁcantly especially if the oﬀspring connects to more than one player. As
illustrated in Figure 50, the larger the player's degree the more likely they are to
achieve more quickly. As a result, the kudos population will decline as the kudos
players leave the network through achievement. Alternatively, if the number of
the ﬁrst generation does not exceed the kudos population then on average there
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Figure 72: Third of three illustrative rounds of the evolving model: round 9000.
Game played in the supercritical region (target of 550). Orange nodes are players
with kudos.
is a small increase in the kudos player's degree. This may result in, as seen in
Figure 65 (right diagram), the kudos player remaining in the network for a long
duration and hence the kudos population grows as new players obtain the golden
unit. We therefore make the following conjecture:
The phase transition occurs when the number of ﬁrst generation multiplied by
their degree is equal to the kudos population.
To explore this conjecture further, a simple analytical model was developed.
The objective of the model is to approximate the sizes of the kudos population
and the ﬁrst generation when they attach to each other. This model may give an
indication of the relationships that determines whether the kudos population will
grow or decline. For this model, we will use an N player fully connected network
but will make the following assumptions:
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Figure 73: The inﬂuence of varying the target upon the number of neighbours of
an achiever and average number of isolated players per achievement event (upper
diagram). The inﬂuence upon units gained beyond the target - Excess Resources
(lower diagram). The initial resource is ﬁxed at 100 units; the initial network size
is 100 players; 10,000 rounds. Results averaged over 50 histories.
1. The network consists of N players, each with an initial resource of I units
and a target of T units.
2. After T - I rounds a proportion A of the players in the network achieve.
3. A = N I
T
. The basis for this is that it is impossible for all players to achieve
without any bankruptcy. However the smaller the distance from I to T
is, the greater the likelihood of achievement. Hence, we have assumed a
proportional relationship to estimate the number of achievers.
4. The golden unit goes to a non kudos player in each round. In other words
the probability of retaining or regaining the golden unit is small.
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Figure 74: How the target inﬂuences the kudos population size as a proportion
of the total network through time (Round). The initial resource is ﬁxed at 100
units; the initial network size is 100 players; 10,000 rounds. Results averaged over
50 histories.
A limitation of the model is that we overestimate the kudos population, as we
are assuming for each round the golden unit will go to a non kudos player. As
well as this, we are not considering the possibility of a kudos player leaving the
network through achievement or bankruptcy. In other words we are calculating
the maximum size of the kudos population after a given number of rounds. Never-
theless, we will compare the analytical and numerical results in order to determine
the limitations of these assumptions.
By assuming the phase transition occurs when the number of the ﬁrst gener-
ation multiplied by their degree is equal to the kudos population, we obtain the
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following equation:
N
I
T
× (C − 1)× k = T − I. (5.3.2)
The variables are:
N - the initial size of the network.
I - the initial resources of each player.
T - the target for each player.
C - the number of oﬀspring of an achiever.
k - the degree of the oﬀspring player.
T − I - the estimated size of the kudos population. There is the assumption that
the golden unit has progressed to a diﬀerent player at each round.
The left hand side of the above expression is multiplied by the initial degree
(k) of the ﬁrst generation player. This is important because, if the initial degree
exceeds the kudos population size then all the kudos players will be attached to
every oﬀspring that arrives. Conversely, the right hand side of the expression is
the estimate of the kudos population size.
Rearranging the above expression, the critical target can be approximated by:
T ∗ ≈ 1
2
×
(
I +
√
I2 + 4×N × I × (C − 1)× k
)
. (5.3.3)
In order to measure the accuracy of the above expression, a comparison with the
numerical result is required. From the evolving model results, as shown in Fig-
ures 59 and 60, it can seen that the phase transition (critical target) occurs where
the ratio between MTTA and MTTB is equal to 1. From the results that generated
the graph in Figure 60, we need to approximate the critical target for a number of
network sizes N . By using the mean value theorem [Gullberg (1997)] and selected
data points from either side of the critical point (shown in Table 10), the numerical
critical target can be approximated for various network sizes. Figure 75 illustrates
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Size N Tsubcritical Tsupercritical ratiosubcritical ratiosupercritical critical target
estimate
35 130 150 0.6385 1.2143 142.5572
50 150 200 0.5995 1.8033 166.6347
60 150 200 0.5622 1.3548 177.6157
65 200 250 0.8272 1.9422 207.7470
75 200 250 0.6578 1.8277 214.6259
100 250 260 0.8278 1.3631 253.2173
125 275 300 0.8343 1.6335 280.1835
150 300 325 0.8299 1.6064 305.4758
175 325 350 0.8480 1.6041 330.0271
190 325 350 0.7378 1.2079 338.9457
200 350 450 0.9510 1.9342 354.9848
250 350 450 0.6605 1.8056 379.6495
Table 10: Estimating the critical target from the simulated results selected data
points (Figure 60) where ratio = MTTA
MTTB
. Here Tsupercritical is the target whose
respected ratio ratiosupercritical is greater than one. Also, Tsubcritical is the target
whose respected ratio ratiosubcritical is less than one.
the comparison between the results shown in Table 10 and the simple analytical
approximation of the critical target.
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Figure 75: Critical target estimate comparison between the numerical simulation
model and the analytical approximation. The initial resource is ﬁxed at 100 units;
oﬀspring entrance degree =2; 10,000 rounds. Result averaged over 50 histories for
the numerical simulation.
Figure 75 illustrates that, for 100 < N < 200, there is a good agreement
between the numerical simulation of the evolving model and the analytical ap-
proximation. This suggests that the ﬁrst generation does indeed inﬂuence whether
kudos population grows or decline and the occurrence of the phase transition. Out-
side this range, the estimate of kudos population and the ﬁrst generation do not
match the numerical results as well. However, the robustness of both the numer-
ical simulation and the analytical approximation solutions will be discussed later
(section 5.3.3).
Apart from the occurrence of a phase transition, the evolving model has other
properties. Firstly, as illustrated in Figure 76 (upper diagram), as the target de-
creases in the subcritical region there is a rapid rise in the proportion of the network
connected to the node with the largest degree. Hence, the evolving model network
topology can evolve into a giant component [Erd®s and Rényi (1959)]. This has
oﬀered one possible explanation of how a giant component comes into being. Fi-
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nally, Figure 76 (lower diagram) illustrates that the target can be regarded as a
tunable parameter to generate high clustering coeﬃcients.
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Figure 76: How the player's target inﬂuences the proportion of the network con-
nected to the node with the largest degree (upper diagram) and network's clus-
tering coeﬃcient C (lower diagram). The initial resource is ﬁxed at 100 units;
the initial network size is 100 players; 10,000 rounds. Results averaged over 50
histories.
5.3.3 Critical Targets and the Scaling Laws
In this section we shall consider the scaling laws for the evolving model and how
they are related to the critical target.
From the simple analytical approximation (section 5.3.2), when the initial re-
source and network size are doubled then the critical target is also doubled. In
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Table 11 we investigate this relationship in the numerical simulation. Here, the
initial network size, the initial resources and the target are increased to see if
the MTTA, MTTB and the ﬁnal population increase by the same factor. Taking
into account the random ﬂuctuation of the numerical simulation, it can be seen
from this table that the normalised output values are indeed closely aligned to the
scaling factors for the input variables. The results are indeed as expected.
Normalised Normalised Normalised Normalised Normalised Normalised
Initial Initial Target MTTA MTTB Final
Network Resource Population
Size
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1.500 1.500 1.500 1.450 1.483 1.512
2.000 2.000 2.000 1.915 1.966 2.030
Table 11: Investigation of the scaling properties of the evolving model. The nor-
malised inputs are the number of the initial network size =100, initial resource =
100, target = 200. The initial network topology was a pure ring lattice; 10,000
rounds were played. Results averaged over 50 histories.
Consequently, it is hypothesized that when the critical target is increased by a
scaling factor the outputs from the evolving model will also increase by the same
factor. In order to investigate this further, all the parameters considered in the
simple analytical approximation were varied. Table 12 shows the reference case
and the other scenarios investigated. Furthermore, both analytical and numerical
estimates of the critical targets were considered in order to test the robustness
of each technique. It can be seen that in Case 2, there is not a good agreement
between the analytical and numerical estimates of the critical targets. This will
be discussed further at the end of this section.
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Case Initial Initial Oﬀ- k Analytical Scaling Numerical Scaling
Network Resource spring Critical Factor Critical Factor
Size N Target Target
1 100 100 3 2 256.16 1.000 253.22 1.000
2 100 100 3 1 200.00 1.281 264.01 0.959
3 100 100 4 2 300.00 0.854 276.34 0.916
4 100 100 5 2 337.23 0.760 290.63 0.871
5 100 50 3 2 168.61 1.519 177.26 1.429
6 100 150 3 2 331.17 0.773 313.16 0.809
7 225 100 3 2 354.14 0.723 378.18 0.670
Table 12: Details of the cases investigated and parameter settings as well as critical
target and scaling factors for the analytical and numerical estimating techniques.
For the remainder of this section, for each scenario the simulated results will be
normalised by the reference case using either the analytical or numerical estimation
of the critical targets.
Firstly, Figure 77 compares the scenario where the oﬀspring has one degree
with the reference case. It is noted that the numerical estimating techniques (right
column diagrams) produced a better agreement to the reference case than its an-
alytical estimating counterpart (left column diagrams). This is especially true for
the ﬁnal population Nf where there seems to be a systematic error. This will be
discussed at the end of this section. Figure 78 compares the scenario where the
achieving player has four or ﬁve oﬀspring with the reference case (three oﬀspring).
It is noted with the exception of the MTTB scenario, both estimating techniques
show good agreement with the reference case when they are normalised. Figure 79
compares the scenario where the initial resource of a player is plus or minus 50
units from the reference case (100 units). Certainly both estimating techniques
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Figure 77: Normalising the MTTA (Top row), MTTB (Middle row) and ﬁnal
population Nf (Bottom row) to the reference case when the degree of the player's
oﬀspring k is equal to one. Left column - the analytical results, Right column
- the numerical results. For the non reference scenarios, the MTTA, MTTB,
ﬁnal population Nf and Targets are scaled by the corresponding factor shown in
Table 12 Case 2. The initial resource is ﬁxed at 100 units; the initial network size
is 100 players; 10,000 rounds. Results averaged over 50 histories.
show good agreement with the reference case when they are normalised for all sce-
narios. However, it must be noted that the numerical estimating technique shows
the better agreement compared to its analytical counterpart. Finally, Figure 80
compares the scenario of an initial network size of 225 players with the reference
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Figure 78: Normalising the MTTA (Top row), MTTB (Middle row) and ﬁnal
population Nf (Bottom row) to the reference case when the number of oﬀspring
is four or ﬁve. Left column - the analytical results, Right column - the numerical
results. For the non reference scenarios, the MTTA, MTTB, ﬁnal population Nf
and Targets are scaled by the corresponding factor shown in Table 12 Cases 3 and
4. The initial resource is ﬁxed at 100 units; the initial network size is 100 players;
10,000 rounds. Results averaged over 50 histories.
case (100 players). As with the initial resource cases, both estimating techniques
show good agreement with the reference case. However yet again, it is observed
that the numerical estimating technique (right column diagram) shows a better
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Figure 79: Normalising the MTTA (Top row), MTTB (Middle row) and ﬁnal
population Nf (Bottom row) to the reference case when the initial resource is 50
or 150 units. Left column - the analytical results, Right column - the numerical
results. For the non reference scenarios, the MTTA, MTTB, ﬁnal population Nf
and Targets are scaled by the corresponding factor shown in Table 12 Cases 5 and
6. The initial resource is ﬁxed at 100 units; the initial network size is 100 players;
10,000 rounds. Results averaged over 50 histories.
agreement than its analytical counterpart (left column diagram).
In summary, the critical target oﬀers a good basis for determining the scaling
law factor for the evolving model. Furthermore, the scaling factor shows that
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Figure 80: Normalising the MTTA (Top row), MTTB (Middle row) and ﬁnal
population Nf (Bottom row) to the reference case when the initial network size N
is equal to 225. Left column - the analytical results, Right column - the numerical
results. For the non reference scenarios, the MTTA, MTTB, ﬁnal population Nf
and Targets are scaled by the corresponding factor shown in Table 12 Case 7. The
initial resource is ﬁxed at 100 units; the reference initial network size is 100 players;
10,000 rounds. Results averaged over 50 histories.
the results in the previous section are not unique but are linked by their critical
target values. We note that the numerical estimate of the critical target oﬀers a
better scaling law than its analytical counterpart. However, for Table 12 Case 2
there was not a good agreement between the analytical and numerical estimates
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of the critical targets. As well as this, in Figure 77, the ﬁnal population Nf ,
there appears to be a systematic error with the analytical estimates. Both of
these statements are related to the oﬀspring degree. In equation 5.3.2 the right
hand side of the expression is the estimate of the kudos population size, which is
independent of the oﬀspring's degree. However, Figure 81 illustrates that the kudos
population size is not independent of the oﬀspring's degree. Most notably for the
target of 260, the kudos population size as a proportion of the total network size
has increased from 9.7 to 25.3 percent (1 dp). Table 12 also shows, by increasing
the oﬀspring's degree from 1 to 2, the target of 260 is now above as opposed to
below the numerical critical target. In other words, the critical target decreases
when the oﬀspring's degree increases. The reasoning behind this is that when an
oﬀspring has a larger initial degree there is more opportunity for this player to
obtain the golden unit. This increases the rate at which players are added to the
kudos population. To counter this and to keep the kudos population size small
(see Figure 74 and section 5.3.2 for characteristics of a subcritical region), the
critical target must decrease in order to increase the rate at which kudos players
are achieving. This factor is not represented in equation 5.3.2. Further work is
required to improve equation 5.3.2 to take into account the degree of the oﬀspring
(see section 6.2).
5.3.4 Incorporating Regulation
In the real world of sport and business competition, if a player, team, or business is
believed to have an unfair advantage then they may be subject to regulation. For
instance in the United Kingdom, Ofcom regulates the communications industry
to ensure a monopoly does not develop. In American Football the best teams are
restricted to the quality of players they can recruit from the college draft. In 1998
the United States Government prosecuted the Microsoft Cooperation for allegedly
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Figure 81: How the target and the degree of the player's oﬀspring k inﬂuences the
kudos population size as a proportion of the total network after 10,000 rounds.
The initial resource is ﬁxed at 100 units; the initial network size is 100 players.
Results averaged over 50 histories.
restricting the market for competing web browsers. The previous section discussed
that in the subcritical region only a few players obtain kudos and those that did
achieved their targets quickly. As in the case of Microsoft, a regulatory body may
judge such competitive rules to be unfair to the rest of the network. Furthermore,
under these circumstances a regulatory body could modify the rules in order for
there to be fairer competition.
In the case of the evolving model, the following was observed: when the target is
in the subcritical region, an oﬀspring will only attach to a small number of players.
To incorporate competitive regulatory behaviour in the evolving model, we shall
adapt the kudos attachment rule. Firstly, we choose an arbitrary weighting factor
that determines whether an oﬀspring or isolated player will attach to an opponent
at random or by using kudos. Secondly, we bias this weighting factor towards the
random attachment rule if an achieving player's exit degree during the simulation
is regarded as being too large. We choose the weighting factor ε to have the
5 BESPOKE PREFERENTIAL ATTACHMENT RULES 124
following form:
ε = 1− e
−β
Nr∑
j=1
Kj
. (5.3.4)
where β is the inﬂuence factor, Kj is the number of rounds player j has held
the golden unit, whereas Nr is the size of the network at round r. Within the
evolving model, when ε approaches 1 the player is more likely to use kudos as their
attachment rule. However, when ε approaches 0, the player is more likely to use
the random attachment. For example, Figure 82 (upper diagram) compares non
regulating and regulated attachment rules on the population size Nr throughout
the game. There are four regulated attachment rules shown; where the objective
is to keep the player's degree < 10, < 20, < 50 and < 100 respectively. If a
player achieves with an exit degree greater than the regulated objective then the
β value is reduced by a certain percentage. In this case the β value is initially
set at 10,000 and the reduction is 10 percent. For example, when the regulated
objective is no more than a degree of 10, it is observed that the network follows
the random attachment closely after 3000 rounds.
Figure 82 lower diagram shows the proportion of players with kudos throughout
the game and the inﬂuence of regulation on this result. In this case, the weighting
factor is adjusted when the achieving player's exit degree exceeds 25. In comparison
with Figure 74 it is observed that the diﬀerence in the cases in the subcritical
region (targets of about 250 see Table 10) is that the proportion of players with
kudos has increased where, by round 10000, at least 15 percent of the players
have kudos. Under the same parameters, the inﬂuence regulation has on the ﬁnal
population and exit degree is illustrated in Figure 83. Due to the limitations on a
player's degree imposed by the regulating attachment rule, an achiever no longer
exhibits a large exiting degree in the subcritical region. Furthermore, for the ﬁnal
population and exiting degree, the regulating attachment rule removes the phase
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Figure 82: Upper diagram is the non regulating and regulating attachment rules'
inﬂuence on the population size Nr throughout the game. The β value is initially
set at 10,000 while the reduction is 10 percent. The target is 200. Lower diagram
is the kudos population as a proportion of the network size with regulation for
diﬀerent targets; regulation activated when the exiting degree exceeds 25, β value
is initially set at 10,000 and the inﬂuence factor β is reduced by 10 percent. The
initial resource is ﬁxed at 100 units; the initial network size is 100 players; 10,000
rounds. Results averaged over 50 histories.
transition observed in the previous section and hence the network imitates the
random attachment behaviour, as discussed in Chapter 4.
In conclusion, this chapter has discussed the development of a bespoke prefer-
ential attachment rule for the Extended GR problem. From other bespoke prefer-
ential attachment rules it was noted that there had to be some beneﬁt for a new
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Figure 83: Inﬂuence of kudos and regulating attachment rule on the ﬁnal popu-
lation Nf (upper diagram) and the achiever's exiting degree k (lower diagram).
Regulation activated when exiting degree exceeds 25 and the inﬂuence factor β is
reduced by 10 percent. The initial resource is ﬁxed at 100 units; the initial network
size is 100 players; 10,000 rounds. Results averaged over 50 histories.
player to attach to an existing player. The kudos preferential attachment rule gives
preference to the player who has held on to a golden unit the longest. It was
found that adopting this attachment rule helped the player to achieve. However,
it was also observed that this attachment rule resulted in a phase transition in
a number of the simulated results. This in turn was inﬂuenced by a critical tar-
get. By investigating this further, a number of key parameters were found which
estimated the critical targets and determined the scaling law for this version of
the Extended GR problem. Finally, by incorporating regulation of competitive
behaviour within the evolving model, it was observed that under highly regulated
conditions the attachment rule will change from kudos to random selection and
the phase transition is removed.
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6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this thesis we investigated the problem of extending the GR problem in order for
it to be played over networks. The motivation of this research was not to model the
behaviour of a gambler per se, but the competitive behaviour of players in business
and social environments. In order to model this competitive behaviour, a series
of numerical simulations were executed using Python and NetworkX. Section 6.1
presents a synopsis of the thesis' contents and simulated results. Section 6.2 ex-
amines some limitations of the adopted approach and explores possible avenues
for improvement and further work.
6.1 Synopsis
In [Hadjiliadis and Vecer (2006)], an extension of the classical GR problem is used
to model the stock market. [Hunter et al (2008)] have adapted the classical GR
problem to model a player who is playing a lottery-type game. Although these
papers use the GR problem to model competitive behaviour, they only consider
a two player game. However, Rocha and Stern [Rocha and Stern (2004)] consider
an N -player GR problem to model a game of gambling. Here, the underlying
network is fully connected as all players are competing against each other. In
contrast, in the business world there are many examples where all players, such as
multinationals, are not all competing against each other and thus the network is
not fully connected. Moreover it is a dynamic network in which the `players' may
come and go and may link to, or disconnect from, other players as time passes.
Thus we have devised an extension of the GR problem that could be played over
dynamical networks which are not necessarily fully connected.
The N -player GR problem played over networks, however, produces a number
of challenges, in particular the payment rule. The payment rule determines which
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player wins resource from their opponents and how much. However, for the clas-
sical and the fully connected N -player GR problem this is trivial in each round
(iteration). A player is randomly selected to win and gains one unit. In contrast,
for the N -player GR problem played over networks, the game can generate more
than one winning player per round. In our model a player is no longer selected
to win but is given a randomly sampled score. It is these scores that determine
whether a player has beaten their opponent. The payment rule we introduce is as
follows:
• In each round, a player gives one unit of resource to its highest scoring
neighbour, provided that neighbour scores higher than the player.
• Otherwise the player keeps their resource.
The consequence of adopting this payment rule approach is that the player can lose
at most one unit of resource, which is independent of the amount of neighbours
they are connected to.
For the classical GR problem (see section 3.1.1), the ﬁnal round is when one
of the players (who starts with an initial resource) becomes ruined, i.e. when the
player's opponent has gained all of their resources. However, [Hadjiliadis (2004)]
describes a version of the GR problem where the player has an objective value
which is less than gaining all of their opponents resources. For the N -player
GR problem played over networks, this objective value is deﬁned as the player's
target. In contrast to the classical GR problem and [Rocha and Stern (2004)]'s
fully connected GR problem (see section 3.1.2), the game does not stop when one
player becomes ruined (loses all of their resources) but continues to a speciﬁed
user-deﬁned ﬁnal round. When a player becomes ruined they depart from the
game. Under these circumstances, the actual structure of the network changes
throughout the duration of the game. In other words, the size of the network
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as well as the distribution of the number of opponents a player is connected to
changes throughout the game, i.e. the network topology changes. To measure this
and its eﬀect on our version of the extended GR problem, we analyse the following
outputs:
1. Mean time to Achievement: This measures the average number of rounds
it takes to achieve for only those players who reach their targets.
2. Mean time to Bankruptcy: This measures the average number of rounds
it takes to bankruptcy for only those players who become ruined.
3. Population: This is the size of the network, in essence how many players
are currently playing.
4. Degree of an Achiever: This measures the number of opponents a player
is connected to when that player achieves their target.
5. Degree of a Bankrupt player: This measures the number of opponents a
player is connected to when that player becomes ruined.
[Barabási (2009)](see Chapter 2) argued that the dynamical behaviour of a com-
plex system is strongly inﬂuenced by its underlying network topology. To inves-
tigate the inﬂuence of the network topology on the extended GR problem, three
numerical simulation models were developed: contracting, ﬁxed and evolving. In
essence, each of these models describes the underlying network topology during
the duration of the numerical simulation.
In the contracting model (see section 3.2.1), the player immediately leaves the
game when either they achieve their target or become bankrupt. This results in
the network topology contracting into the classical two player GR problem.
In our ﬁxed model (see section 3.2.4), the player remains in the game even
when they achieve their target or becomes bankrupt. In this event, the player's
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resources are reset to its initial value in the next round. The network topology
remains ﬁxed throughout the game.
In our evolving model (see section 4.2), the player immediately leaves the game
when either they achieve their target or become bankrupt. However unlike the
contracting model, if the player achieves then they have oﬀspring. The oﬀspring
divide their parent's resources amongst themselves, join the network and play
the game against existing opponents. This also results in the network topology
changing throughout the game but in a much richer way than in our contracting
model.
We considered three preferential attachment rules: random (see section 4.2),
degree dependent (biased towards the players with the highest number of oppo-
nents, see section 4.2) and kudos (see section 5.3). In this context, kudos means
that the oﬀspring try to acquire a beneﬁt from attaching to a particular opponent.
In the evolving model, to achieve their goal, the oﬀspring attach to existing players
in the network who have kudos. Their goal is to increase the likelihood of achieving
their target (see section 5.3). With this in mind, the oﬀspring can increase the
likelihood of achieving their target if they increase the number of opponents they
are playing. To reiterate, a player can lose at most one unit of resource which is
independent from how many opponents they are playing (see section 3.2).
As explained in section 5.3, kudos has three phases: ﬁrstly, the player attaches
to a competitor who is popular; secondly, the player competes with the other
competitor neighbours to become popular; ﬁnally, if the player becomes popular,
they attract and compete with new and existing opponents to achieve their goal.
In section 5.3 we also deﬁned the kudos players as individuals who have held
or are holding the golden unit. It must be noted that players that become
isolated (all of their opponents have achieved or become ruined) follow the same
attachment rule. Subsequently, when varying the player's target and observing
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the eﬀect on parameters such as mean time to achievement (MTTA), mean time
to bankruptcy (MTTB), ﬁnal population and degree of achievement, there occurs
a phase transition within the results (see section 5.3.2). This behaviour is not
observed in the random or degree dependent attachment rules. In section 5.3.2
we deﬁned the critical target to be where the MTTA is equal to the MTTB; the
subcritical region, to be where the MTTA is less than the MTTB; and ﬁnally
the supercritical region, to be where the MTTA is greater than the MTTB. In
terms of the kudos preferential attachment rule and the subcritical region, a player
achieves their target quicker when the game is played in subcritical conditions. Also
from section 5.3.2, kudos is obtained by only a small proportion of the network,
less than 5 percent. As a result, the oﬀspring attaches to a limited number of
players who have kudos. Subsequently, the kudos player's degree increases rapidly;
this also improves their probability of achievement within a few rounds. Under
these circumstances, when the kudos player achieves, a large proportion of their
neighbours become isolated. They then attach to those few players who have
kudos.
In section 5.3.2 we also detailed the case of the supercritical region. Here,
because the target is large, a player is required to ruin a greater number of their
opponents in comparison to the subcritical region. As a result, players obtain their
target slower in this region. Consequentially, kudos is gained by a larger proportion
of the network and new oﬀspring can attach to a greater number of kudos players.
Nevertheless, the kudos player's degree increases but at a slower rate in compari-
son to those in the subcritical region and fewer opponents become isolated every
time there is an achievement. In section 5.3.2 we described both an analytical and
numerical estimate of the critical target. As well as this, the scaling laws for the
simulated results were discussed. It was noted that the analytical estimate works
well when varying the initial size of the network and resources. However, the ana-
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lytical estimate fares less well when varying the number of oﬀspring produced per
achievement and the degree of the oﬀspring. Section 5.3.2 also detailed that in the
subcritical region any arbitrary network topology evolves into a giant component.
This is similar to the giant component discussed by [Erd®s and Rényi (1959)] in
their random network model. Finally, as discussed in section 5.3.4, we described
and incorporated regulation of competitive behaviour within the evolving model.
Furthermore, it was observed that under highly regulated conditions the attach-
ment rule will change from kudos to random selection which resulted in the phase
transition being removed.
6.2 Future Work
In the future, it may be possible that the numerical simulation and analysis we have
given in this thesis could be extended in various directions. Firstly, in section 5.3.2
we described the analytical estimate of the critical target. This estimate provided
good agreement when the initial size and initial resource were varied. However,
this was not as good when varying the number of oﬀspring and especially when
varying the degree of oﬀspring. Hence, future research would consider discovering a
better analytical estimate for the critical target. Another key point also discussed
in section 5.3.2 is the numerical estimate of the critical target. It was stated that
the numerical estimate of the critical target occurred when the MTTA and the
MTTB were equal. In this thesis, however, we have oﬀered no explanation as to
why this relationship occurs. With this in mind, future research could investigate
further the relationship between the MTTA, MTTB and the critical target.
Secondly, in sections 3.2.1, 3.2.4 and 4.2 we explored some properties of the Ex-
tended GR problem. However, the largest network generated was approximately
350 players. A future research project could consider undertaking numerical sim-
ulations of much larger networks, a million players for example. By simulating a
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much larger network, possible future work may further validate the conclusions of
this thesis as well as discover possible new properties of the Extended GR problem.
Thirdly, section 3.2.1 described our payment rule of the Extended GR problem.
However, future research could consider more generalized payment rules:
• In each round, a player gives 1 unit of resource to the e neighbours with the
highest score, if those neighbours scores higher than the said player.
• If the player only has z resources left, where z < e, then the player gives
only 1 unit to each of his z highest scoring neighbours, if and only if those
neighbours score higher than the said player.
• Otherwise the player keeps their resource.
This payment rule would model social and business competitive behaviour more
realistically than the one in this thesis. For example, if two businesses were the
players and the customers were the units, then it could be argued that a business
could lose more than one customer to its competitor in one round. The changes in
these payment rules have the potential to create new emergent behaviour on the
macroscopic scale.
Fourthly, in section 5.3 we described a player who has held or is holding the
golden unit as the kudos player. Section 5.3.2 described how in the supercritical
region, a high proportion of the network have kudos. However, future research
may wish to explore kudos that decays with time. For instance, the longer a
player holds kudos, the more it depreciates. This possibly has the implication of
increasing the critical target. Finally, section 2.2.2 discussed evolutionary game
theory, most notably the iterative prisoner's dilemma. Here, the players were given
or chose a strategy to achieve their goals. However, in the numerical simulations of
the Extended GR problem, there is not a strategy given or chosen by the players.
Hence in this thesis, the player's success or failure is driven purely by random
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processes. A theme of research considered but never pursued was to give the players
a strategy. Future research may wish to investigate the eﬀect a player's strategy
has on the Extended GR problem. For instance, in an N -player network, we might
consider a scenario in which seven individual players have diﬀerent strategies. The
other N − 7 players are driven purely by random processes. The seven strategies
we could consider are:
1. Appraisal Period: The player with this strategy, after a predeﬁned set
number of rounds, switches opponents (rewires) if their loss of resources is
deemed as too great. The motivation behind this strategy is to ﬁnd opponents
that are easier to beat.
2. Adapt Target: The player with this strategy decreases their target if their
opponents are deemed as being too strong. The motivation behind this strategy
is to achieve with a smaller target and hope that their oﬀspring fares better.
3. Suspension: The player with this strategy suspends playing their opponents
if they are deemed as being too strong. The motivation behind this strategy is
to protect their resources and hope the opponents achieve during the duration
of suspension.
4. Search: The player with this strategy switches opponents (rewires) after
a predeﬁned set number of rounds if they have not obtained kudos. The
motivation behind this strategy is to actively ﬁnd and hopefully beat the player
with the golden unit, so that kudos is obtained.
5. Merger: The player with this strategy merges with a non-strategy player
after a predeﬁned set number of rounds and hence combines resources. The
motivation behind this strategy is to achieve through competition and merger.
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6. Weakest: The player with this strategy only attaches to opponents that are
weaker.
7. Franchise: The player with this strategy splits into franchise agents. Each
agent then connects to diﬀerent parts of the network and plays the GR prob-
lem. If the sum of all the agents' resources is equal to or greater than the
target, then all the franchise agents combine into one player and leave the
network through achievement.
The oﬀspring of these players adopt the same strategy. By considering the above
strategies, future research could investigate the behaviour that emerges on the
macroscopic scale. This model would relate more closely to social and business
competitive behaviour.
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A The Robustness of the Numerical Simulations
Throughout this thesis we have used numerical simulation as a tool to assist with
the research. However, some parameters have remained ﬁxed throughout the the-
sis, such as the number of rounds and histories. In this appendix we will oﬀer
an explanation as to why these parameters were selected and we will test the
robustness of the solutions quoted.
In terms of the number of rounds, Figure 42 show that, for a variety of network
sizes, the number of players reaches a steady state in between 2,000 and 4,000
rounds. However, the results quoted in this thesis are for 10,000 rounds. In the
case of any future modelling activity, we decided not to shorten the simulation
duration.
Figure 84 demonstrates the robustness of the number of histories that were
selected. This analysis was undertaken with the contracting, ﬁxed and evolving
models. Throughout the thesis we have decided to use 50 histories for each analysis.
As can be seen in the case of the ﬁxed and evolving model, for the MTTA and
MTTB, the results become stable after about 40 histories. The results for the
contracting model are less stable. Nevertheless, the main results of Chapter 5 are
obtained from the evolving model. Table 13 illustrates that, for each target stated,
there is not much diﬀerence between results obtained from 50 or 100 histories.
Figure 85 illustrates the uncertainty of the results. Here for the evolving model,
the uncertainty is shown for the MTTA as the target is increased. The error bars
represent plus and minus one standard deviation from the mean. In concurrence
with Figure 58, a phase transition is still observed at each end of the error bars.
In section 3.2 we stated that the standard deviation was ﬁxed so that the
strongest player (strength of 1) has a 5
6
chance of beating the weakest opponent.
The choice of standard deviation value was chosen to calibrate with earlier method-
ology undertaken in the research. Originally for the numerical simulation, the
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Figure 84: Variation of the MTTA - Left column and MTTB - Right column over
the number of histories simulated. Contracting model - Top row, Fixed model -
Middle row and Evolving model (kudos attachment rule) - Bottom row. Network
topology is a pure ring with 100 players, initial resources of 100 and a target of
200.
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MTTA MTTA MTTB MTTB Nf Nf
Target 50 100 50 100 50 100
Histories Histories Histories Histories Histories Histories
130 95.18 95.15 184.91 185.01 255.92 256.57
150 92.38 92.32 177.85 177.68 245.98 245.62
200 89.10 89.08 159.29 159.17 225.48 225.41
250 146.64 144.94 177.16 176.63 194.86 194.54
260 304.93 304.07 231.03 227.24 163.60 163.16
275 500.12 497.03 289.87 289.02 135.58 135.86
300 638.17 640.04 337.98 338.72 121.86 121.81
350 872.50 873.77 421.23 421.84 102.92 101.75
450 1317.72 1320.34 580.74 576.90 75.18 76.26
550 1764.10 1752.20 720.87 720.40 59.50 60.21
Table 13: Variation of the MTTA, MTTB and Nf over 50 and 100 histories.
Initial resource is ﬁxed at 100 units, initial network size is 100 players and there
are 10,000 rounds. Results averaged over 50 or 100 histories. Results rounded to
2 decimal places.
player would have sampled from not a normal distribution but from a triangular
distribution. However, it was argued that it was the triangular distribution, most
particularly the discontinuous ﬁrst derivative, that contributed to the phase tran-
sition (see Figure 58). In order to investigate this, a normal distribution with an
appriopiate standard deviation was chosen. This ensured that the same probabil-
ity for a player with strength 1 beating an opponent with strength 0 was used.
Repeating the numerical simulations, with the discontinuous ﬁrst derivative now
removed, the results still showed a phase transition. Therefore, this eﬀect was
independent of the probability distribution chosen.
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Figure 85: The inﬂuence of target on the MTTA. The error bars represent plus
and minus one standard deviation from the mean. Initial resource is ﬁxed at 100
units, initial network size is 100 players, 10,000 rounds. Results averaged over 50
histories.
Furthermore, Figure 86 demonstrates by varying this probability between 1
2
and 1 that the resulting MTTA remains within one standard deviation of the
reference case (5
6
). Nevertheless, the critical target in all three cases remains in
approximately the same position.
Figure 86: The inﬂuence of target and of the probability of the strongest player
beating the weakest opponent on the MTTA. Initial resource are ﬁxed at 100
units, initial network size is 100 players, 10,000 rounds. Results averaged over 50
histories.
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In summary, the numerical simulation is robust for 10000 rounds, 50 histories
and a choice of 5
6
for the probability of the strongest player beating the weakest.
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